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The Outermost Regions are among the EU’s least developed regions. As a result, European policy-
making towards them are often catered to their realities as stated in EU treaties and Commission 
Communications. Despite EU recognition of their socio-economic challenges, their levels of socio-
economic development continue to be among the EU’s lowest. As subnational political units, on 
the other hand, the Outermost Regions have political representation in both their member states as 
well as EU levels of governments. However, because the Outermost Regions have varying levels 
of political autonomy, their political participation within both levels of government vary as well. 
This thesis asks the following overarching research question: “Why are some Outermost Regions 
more economically successful than others?” In order to answer this research question, this thesis 
takes the independent variables of political autonomy and structural fund allocation while taking 
their economic “success” as the dependent variable. “Success”, in this case, is measured as the 
Islands’ growth in GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (PPS) towards the established 
EU28 average. The thesis’s established timeline consists of the 2007-2013 structural programming 
period specifically in which the data collection consists of data obtained from Eurostat, Inforegio, 
as well as the National Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRFs) from each of the respective 
member states and regions. The results obtained, however, indicate a positive, yet moderately low, 
correlation between political autonomy and economic “success” and a negative, albeit low, 
correlation between structural fund allocation and the Outermost Regions’ economic success 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 In October 26, 2017 both French President Emmanuel Macron and Commission President 
Jean-Claude Juncker visited the French overseas department of French Guyana for the fourth 
edition of the Forum of the Outermost Regions. The forum gathered the presidents of the 
European Union’s Outermost Regions, representatives from their respective member states, as 
well as representatives from the EU’s institutions. The purpose of the forum was for the 
discussing of matters in regards to their regional development and their further integration to the 
EU. The forum came as a result of recent institutional developments that have strengthened its 
responsibilities towards the Outermost Regions (see article 349 of the Treaty of Lisbon, 2009; 
see also COM (2017) 623). Despite the forum being an EU-wide event, the visit from both 
statesmen to French Guyana was met with protests from the local population in which they 
argued that France has shown a general neglect towards the region.  
 In the years 2016 and 2017, French Guyana experienced civil unrest that has come as a 
result of high levels of unemployment, dysfunctional public services, and organized crime 
(Robert, 2017). The problems faced by French Guyana, however, are not unique to the rest of the 
Outermost Regions. Like French Guyana, the rest of the Outermost Regions also suffer from 
high levels of unemployment as well as low levels of socio-economic development vis-à-vis the 
European continent. As a result, they tend to be much more dependent on the EU’s structural 
funds for their economic development (Wehbe Herrera, 1999; Lorincz, 2011, Dentinho, et al., 
2001). Despite the EU’s recognition of their socio-economic challenges, its contribution to the 
Outermost Regions has been limited to small development projects that representatives of these 
regions often criticize as inadequate and marginal to their needs (Robert, 2017). Considering the 
events that took place in French Guyana, a number of questions need to be asked. For instance, 
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how successful have the Outermost Regions been in securing structural funds from the EU? 
What has been done at the member state level of government to address the situation of its 
Outermost Regions? And finally, what has the EU done in regards to the Outermost Regions’- as 
well as European regions in general- in regards to their regional economic development?   
 This thesis is concerned with the role of the European Union towards the Outermost 
Regions as well as the Outermost Regions’ access to the EU’s institutions, particularly in regards 
to their regional development. The Outermost Regions are an extension of the European Union’s 
jurisdiction given that their geographic location extends to different parts of the globe. These 
regions consist of nine territories under the jurisdiction of three EU member states: France, 
Spain, and Portugal. These territories are composed of the Canary Islands, under Spain; the 
overseas territories and departments, under France; and Madeira and the Azores, under Portugal. 
Among their common variables, the Outermost Regions are characterized for their remoteness 
from the European continent, their insularity, high population density, as well as low levels of 
economic development when compared to regions in the European continent (Murray, 2012: 71-
90; see also article 299(2) of the Amsterdam Treaty, 1997).  
 Politically speaking, these territories have a constitutionally guaranteed access and 
representation to decision-making institutions in both their member states as well as the 
institutions of the EU. However, despite their guaranteed representation at both the national and 
EU levels of government, their access to decision-making at both levels of government vary 
from member state to member state. The reason for this is due to the fact that at the national 
level, France, Spain, and Portugal, have varying levels of political decentralization (e.g. 
Bullmann, 1997; Marks, 1997; Bache, 2008). For instance, Spain is a highly decentralized state 
that has gradually granted broader competencies to its autonomous communities (Bache, 2008: 
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65; Morata & Muñoz, 1996; see also Title VIII of the Spanish Constitution, 1978). Portugal, on 
the other hand, while it continues to be a centralized state, has granted formal political autonomy 
to its island regions of Madeira and the Azores (Bache, 2008: 61; Pacheco Amaral, 2011; 
Nanetti, et al., 2004; Antunes and Magone, 2018; see also Title VII of the Portuguese 
Constitution, 1976). Finally, although France continues to be a highly centralized state, it has 
also implemented measures of political decentralization in the past decades with the creation of 
the regions as well as constitutionally recognizing the unique characteristics of its overseas 
territories and departments (e.g. Smith, 1997; see also Articles 73 and 74 of the Fifth French 
Constitution, 1958).  
At the EU level of government, the Outermost Regions have guaranteed access to its 
decision-making institutions and have been known to be active players within its institutions 
(e.g. Tuñón, 2008). Their guaranteed access, however, has come as a result of gradual 
institutional reforms that have taken place in the EU. As subnational regions, it may be stated 
that their increased access to the EU’s decision-making institutions began with the post-1988 
structural funds reform and a number of key provisions in the Maastricht Treaty (Jeffery, 1997; 
2000; Hooghe & Marks, 1996; 2001; see also Article 146 of the Treaty on European Union, 
1992). The 1988 structural funds reform made the partnership principle a key delivery system for 
cohesion policy (Baun & Tarek, 2014). In the 1988 framework regulation, partnership was 
defined as close consultations between the Commission, the Member State and the region 
involved (Baun & Tarek, 2014:147; Hooghe, 1996; Bache, 1998; 2008). Each successive 
structural fund reform brought broader liberalization for regional and non-regional participation 
(Baun & Tarek, 2014). As a result, member states have implemented various measures of 
decentralization as a means to provide a more efficient means for the distribution of structural 
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funds (Bullmann, 1997; Hooghe, 1996). In regards to the EU’s recognition of the Outermost 
Regions’ unique geographic and economic challenges, its first mention came with the passage of 
the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 when it stated that Euro-policy should be catered to their realities 
(see article 299(2) of the Amsterdam Treaty, 1997). Their recognition of their unique challenges 
continued with articles 349 and 355 of the Lisbon Treaty in which, unlike article 299(2) of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, establishes a more proactive role from Brussels to these regions.  
 Despite the granting of regional access to decision-making institutions, the general 
impact of the regions in European regional policy has been varied and it has mostly come as a 
result of the member states’ difference in political decentralization (e.g. Bomberg & Peterson, 
1998; Tuñón, 2008; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Marks, 1996). It has been stated that regions from 
federal or highly decentralized states have a more active role in EU decision-making than regions 
from centralized governments (Bullmann, 1997; Jeffery, 1997; 2000). The reason for this, it is 
argued, is due to their member states’ inclusion at the different stages of structural programing 
(Marks, 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 93-104). As a result, some regions have more political 
influence in the implementation of regional policy than other regions; hence, translating into a 
larger allocation of structural funds (Hooghe and Marks, 2001).   
It must be noted, however, that the planning, implementation, and allocation of structural 
funds takes place the year before the establishment of the structural programming period (Baun 
and Marek, 2014; Bachtler, et al., 2007). It is during the planning phase where regions are also 
categorized in regards to their structural funding eligibility. Structural funding eligibility are 
categories determining the amount of assigned structural funds and the purposes for which they 
are to be used depending on the regions’ GDP per capita in purchasing power standards, or PPS, 
in relation to the EU average. In other words, regions with lower GDP per capita in PPS are 
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allocated increased and intensive structural funding than regions with a GDP closer to the EU 
average.   
This thesis argues that the same situation applies to the Outermost Regions. As was stated 
earlier, Spain, Portugal, and France have each varying degrees of political decentralization 
within their jurisdictions. As a result, regions in Spain, Portugal, and France have had varying 
degrees of economic success when it comes to their regional development (e.g. Bache, 2008). Of 
the EU’s Outermost Regions, it has been the Canary Islands the Outermost Region that has taken 
a more proactive role in the EU’s decision-making institutions as well as it has shown the most 
success in regional development (Tuñón, 2008). As an autonomous community from Spain, the 
Canaries have sought active representation in both institutional as well as non-institutional forms 
of political representation, a phenomenon that has also been seen in other Spanish autonomous 
communities (Morata and Muñoz, 1996; Tuñón, 2008). In his comparative work on regional 
mobilization in the Canary Islands and Wallonia, Tuñón (2008) measures the regions’ success 
with their increase in GDP establishing a timeline spanning from 1986 to 2006. Unlike regions 
within the European continent, however, the Outermost Regions have a treaty-based recognition 
of their economic and developmental challenges which have been used to their advantage when 
it comes to the securing of structural funds (Tuñón, 2008; Wehbe, 1999; Dentinho, et al. 2001; 
see also Treaty of Lisbon, articles 349 and 355). This is one conclusion Tuñón arrives at when 
explaining the success of the Canary Islands in increasing their GDP which has been due to their 
Treaty-based recognition as an ultraperipheral region (Tuñón, 2008).     
This thesis establishes a comparative study between the EU’s Outermost Regions and the 
allocation of structural funds. This thesis addresses the following overarching research question: 
“Why are some Outermost Regions economically successful, while others are not?” In order to 
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answer this overarching research question, this research question needs to be divided into two 
distinct research questions: 
Research question I: Does variation in the Outermost Regions’ political autonomy lead to 
their economic success?  
 
Research question II: Does a greater allocation of structural funds lead to the Outermost 
Regions’ economic success?   
 
These two research questions consist of the independent variables of political autonomy and 
structural fund allocation while the dependent variable consist of the Outermost Regions’ 
economic success. Economic success, for the purposes of this thesis, is measured as the 
Outermost Regions’ growth in GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPS) based on the 
EU28 average of 100. In order to answer this question, the following research design is 
proposed. This thesis takes the EU’s Outermost Regions as its main case study. In order to 
measure the Outermost Regions’ progress, I establish a timeline consisting of the 2007-2013 
structural funding period. The reason for the establishment of this timeline is due to the fact that 
the 2007-2013 is the most recent structural funding period in which complete data is readily 
available. The EU is currently on the 2014-2020 structural funding period and full data on 
investment and growth is still underway. Of interest to this thesis is the information specifically 
focusing on the programming period’s National Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRFs) from 
the Outermost Regions’ member states and their respective financial allocations.  
 In regards to theoretical framework, multilevel governance theory is applied as a means 
to explain the Outermost Regions’ role in the securing of EU structural funds. A theoretical 
framework brought forth by Marks (1992), multilevel governance states that increased European 
integration has brought forth other actors into European decision-making. Although member 
states, or national governments, continue to be the main actors within the EU, actors such as EU 
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institutions, regional and subnational governments, as well as non-governmental organizations 
have also come to the fore of government decision-making (Marks 1992; Hooghe, 1996; Hooghe 
& Marks, 2001; Jeffery, 1997; 2000; Bache, 2008, Baun & Tarek, 2014). Multilevel governance 
has been used to explain the decentralization of member states as well as subnational 
mobilization within the EU (e.g. Hooghe, 1995). One such area in which multilevel governance 
has also been applied has been in regards to Cohesion Policy. Considered to be the first area in 
which multilevel governance has been applied, Cohesion Policy is the EU’s main policy on 
economic and social development within its jurisdictions (Baun and Marek, 2014; Bache, 1998; 
2008). As stated earlier in the chapter, the 1988 structural fund reform brought along the 
partnership principle as a key reform towards subnational participation in EU policy which, in 
turn, led to a subsequent decentralization from member states (e.g. Bache, 2008; Jeffery, 1997).  
 Although the focus is on the Outermost Regions, this thesis contributes to the larger 
literature by adding to the general discussion on European integration. It is often overlooked the 
fact that the EU’s jurisdiction encompasses the whole globe. While European integration often 
focuses on the EU’s challenge in integrating its member states within the European continent, it 
also faces the challenge of integrating its Outermost Regions. As stated earlier in the chapter, the 
Outermost Regions have historically required accommodated policies given that their socio-
economic challenges are either unique or much more pronounced than in other European regions. 
As a result, the EU has implemented such policies to tend to their socio-economic handicaps. In 
addition, given that increased integration has brought forth increased mobilization from regional, 
or subnational, governments, not much work has been done in regard to the Outermost Regions’ 
political mobilization particularly focusing on the EU’s regional funds (e.g. Tuñón, 2008; 
Antunes and Magone, 2018). Because most works on the EU has often taken a regional or 
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continental approach, given the Outermost Regions’ scattered location, this thesis also attempts 
to establish a much more global outlook towards the study of the EU.   
The following chapters continue as follows. Chapter 2, provides a historical background 
on the Outermost Regions’ position within the different EU treaties as well as their respective 
member states’ constitutions. The purpose of this chapter is to point out the Outermost Regions’ 
evolving status, particularly within the EU, for which their structural and economic handicaps 
are recognized and, as a result, policy-making and financial allocations are implemented to 
address their particularities. On the other hand, the information about the Outermost Regions’ 
constitutional position within their respective member states serves as a means to address their 
degree of political autonomy. Chapter 3 establishes the thesis’s literature review focusing on 
work that has traditionally focused on the Outermost Regions and their relationship to the EU. 
Past work on the Outermost Regions has traditionally focused on the areas of economic 
development in which either the member state or the EU has taken the initiative of implementing 
specific policy (e.g. Lorincz, 2011). The following two chapters, Chapters 4 and 5, establish the 
thesis’s theoretical framework. Chapter 4 establishes a literature review on Multilevel 
Governance providing a historical background on its origins as well as the EU integration 
phenomena it has traditionally been applied to. Chapter 5, on the other hand, continues the 
discussion on Multilevel Governance specifically focusing on the role of Cohesion Policy. 
Chapter 6 provides background information on the thesis chronological framework by explaining 
the origins and characteristics of the 2006 reform on Cohesion Policy and its subsequent 2007-
2013 structural programming period. The following chapter, Chapter 7, establishes the thesis’s 
research design. It is in this chapter in which I further discuss the thesis’s research question, 
establish and explain the thesis’s variables, as well as establish its hypothesis. Chapter 8 focuses 
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on the discussion of the results presented. It is in this chapter in which I present the obtained data 
and determine whether or not the hypotheses presented earlier in this research hold or not. The 
results obtained, however, establish either a positive, yet moderately low, correlation (0.45) or a 
negative, albeit low, correlation (-0.32) between the established variables. Chapter 9 is the 
thesis’s discussion chapter. This chapter presents an analysis of the results and discuss the 
possible causes for these. It is in this chapter where the thesis’s limitations are discussed as well 
as Finally, Chapter 10 is the concluding chapter whose purpose is to rehash the thesis’s obtained 




















TREATY AND CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND  
ON THE OUTERMOST REGIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 The focus of this chapter is to provide a historical background of the Outermost Regions’ 
constitutional position within both the European treaties as well as their constitutional position 
within their respective member states. The Outermost Regions’ structural and economic 
handicaps have been taken into consideration ever since the initial establishment of the European 
Economic Community. The same has also applied within their respective national governments. 
As a result, the Outermost Regions have benefitted from distinct policy, such as increased 
political autonomy, as well as financial allocations, such as the POSEI programmes, which have 
been designed to address their structural and economic handicaps from both the EU and their 
respective national governments. Tying this chapter to the thesis’s research question, it is 
important to see how the Outermost Regions’ status has led to their distinct financial allocations 
throughout the different structural programming periods.    
The Outermost Regions in European Treaties 
 Mention of the Outermost, or Ultraperipheral, Regions of the European Union began with 
the founding Treaty of Rome in 1957. Its article 227(2) at the time only applied to the French 
overseas territories and Algeria and “merely stated that the Community institutions would 
provide for their economic and institutional development” (Murray, 2012: 74; see also article 
227(2) of the Treaty of Rome, 1957). Since the early years of the founding of the EU, officials 
were aware of the handicaps brought upon the implementation of uniform policy to the overseas 
territories. The issue was initially clarified with the Hansen Declaration in 1977 which took into 
consideration the, then, DOMs’ geographic, economic, and social situation and allowed for the 
implementation of EU policy to be applied in stages (see Case 148/77 (1978)). It was also during 
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this time period where the EU began to take an active and differentiated role towards its island 
regions. Two key events to be considered were the draft resolution on the specific problems of 
European Atlantic regions, presented during the 13th session of the Conference of Local and 
Regional Powers in 1978 and the creation of the Peripheral Islands Committee in 1979 (Wehbe 
Herrera, 1999). Despite no major treaty change including the current Outermost Regions until 
the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU still took an active role in regards to their integration.   
 With Spain and Portugal’s accession to the EU in 1986, the Commission found itself with 
the challenge of not only integrating both member states, but their respective Outermost Regions 
as well. One such example came about with the POSEI programs. The POSEI programs, 
however, emerged as a consequence of the Single European Act (SEA) in which in order to 
integrate the EU into a single common market, the Commission created a series of funds as a 
means to integrate their weaker member states (Wehbe Herrera, 1999). Originally applied in 
1989 to the French DOMs and TOMs under POSEIDOM, the POSEI programs were created by 
the Commission as a means to provide specific measures for the particular needs of the 
Outermost Regions. Further programs taking into consideration the Canaries, as well as Madeira 
and the Azores emerged in 1991 under POSEICAN and POSEIMA respectively. Despite the 
programs’ specific measures, they were mostly focused on the territories’ agricultural and fishing 
industries (Murray, 2012; Wehbe-Herrera, 1999). It is also necessary to mention that the POSEI 
programs were implemented right after the 1988 reform on structural funds. Although the 
reform’s main tenet of the Partnership Agreement required participation from subnational 
governments, the Outermost Regions were not included or consulted in its implementation 
(Murray, 2012).  
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 The passage of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 did not bring about great change to the 
Outermost Regions in regards to their specificities. Aside from eliminating Algeria from the 
Treaty, it brought the recognition of the Outermost Regions’ special position within the EU (see 
Declaration on the Outermost Regions of the Community of the Treaty of Maastricht, 1992). As 
subnational regions, on the other hand, the passage of the Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent 
reform of the structural funds in 1993 paved the way towards regional participation within the 
institutions of the EU (e.g. Hooghe, 1995, 1996). Article 146, for instance, allowed for the 
regional participation in the Council of Ministers and the creation of the Committee of the 
Regions in 1994 allowed for regions to have an institutional outlet for the first time (see article 
146 of the Maastricht Treaty, 1992; see also chapter 4 of the Maastricht Treaty). 
 The major change to the EU’s Outermost Regions, however, came about in 1997 with the 
passage of article 299(2) of the Amsterdam Treaty. Unlike past EU treaties, article 299(2) 
brought a number of important changes in regards to the EU’s responsibilities towards the 
Outermost Regions. For instance, both the Canaries as well as Madeira and the Azores were 
officially recognized as Outermost Regions alongside the French overseas territories and 
departments. On the other hand, article 299(2) also detailed their economic, geographic, and 
social handicaps in which specific policies were to be tailored to their realities. Finally, as a 
means to prevent a veto on policies on their behalf, article 299(2) also introduced qualified 
majority voting whenever policies on their behalf were to be discussed (Murray, 2012: 85).  
The passage of article 299(2) meant that the EU, alongside their member states, had to 
take a more proactive role towards the development of their Outermost Regions. In the years 
leading up to the Lisbon Treaty and thereafter, the Commission has launched a series of 
communications whose main purpose has been to keep track of the development of its Outermost 
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Regions. As Murray summarizes, the communications released in 2004 and 2007 focus on the 
EU’s strategy towards its Outermost Regions (Murray, 2012: 85-88). For instance, the 
communications recognized that policy should take into consideration their unique 
characteristics as well as that the EU has not taken the regions into full consideration (see COM 
(2004) 343). Aside from the traditional areas of agriculture and fisheries, the communications 
released by the Commission have also called on improving their infrastructure, transport, as well 
as their relationship with regional neighbors in the ACP countries (e.g. COM (2004) 343; COM 
(2012) 170). On the other hand, because of the EU’s recognition of the Outermost Regions’ 
structural handicaps, these communications also called for additional financial aid in regards to 
Cohesion Policy (see COM (2012) 170). Depending on the structural fund, such as the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) or the European Social Fund (ESF), it was the amount to 
be allocated for projects in the Outermost Regions with some projects covering up to 75 percent 
of the costs. With each passing communication we have seen how the EU, alongside its member 
states, promotes differentiated policies towards the Outermost Regions’ development.   
    The Lisbon Treaty has brought about the last amendment in regards to the EU’s 
relationship with the Outermost Regions. First of all, the treaty of Lisbon splits article 299(2) 
into two separate articles, articles 349 and 355. While article 349 states the EU’s responsibilities 
towards the Outermost Regions; article 355, on the other hand, opened the door to the possibility 
of French, Dutch, and Danish overseas countries and territories (OCTs) to become Outermost 
Regions without having to undergo massive treaty amendments (see article 355 of the Lisbon 
Treaty, 2009). In regards to the Commission’s communication towards its Outermost Regions, 
its last two communications, however, have taken place after passage of the Lisbon Treaty in 
which the EU now takes a more proactive role towards its Outermost Regions.  
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The Outermost Regions’ Constitutional Relations with their Member States  
 While the Outermost Regions’ position in the treaties of the EU has been modified with 
each new passage, their constitutional relations with their member states have also changed 
through time as well. The change in relationship has come mostly in the form of political 
decentralization from part of the member states in which the region obtained political autonomy. 
Despite their member states’ political decentralization, the Outermost Regions’ level of political 
autonomy still varies from member state to member state. For example, Spain is a highly 
decentralized state that has gradually granted broader competencies to its autonomous 
communities (e.g. Bache, 2008: 65; Morata & Muñoz, 1996; see also Title VIII of the Spanish 
Constitution, 1978). Portugal, on the other hand, while it continues to be a centralized state, has 
granted formal political autonomy to its island regions of Madeira and the Azores (Bache, 2008: 
61; Pacheco Amaral, 2011; see also Title VII of the Portuguese Constitution, 1976). Finally, 
although France continues to be a highly centralized state, it also implemented measures of 
political decentralization in the past decades with the creation of the regions as well as 
constitutionally recognizing the unique characteristics of its overseas territories and departments 
(e.g. Smith, 1997; Loughlin 2007; see also articles 73 and 74 of the Fifth French Constitution, 
1958). The following paragraphs provide a summary of the evolution of each of the Outermost 
Regions’ constitutional relationship with their respective member states.  
The French DOMs and TOMs 
 Numerically comprising most of the Outermost Regions, the overseas territories and 
departments of France have different constitutional variations although both share the common 
variable of having formal political representation in both the French and European institutions. 
The main differences between the overseas territories and departments lie in their constitutional 
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relationship to France. In regards to the overseas departments, French law applies equally to 
them as to the rest of the departments in metropolitan France. French law, however, has made 
certain modifications in regards to their application to the overseas departments (see article 73 of 
the Fifth French Constitution, 1958). The overseas territories, on the other hand, are governed 
through autonomy statutes that allow them to enact their own laws (ibid.). Despite France’s 
Jacobin tradition of state centralization, the creation of the Régions in 1982 brought with it the 
creation of elected regional councils, which were also applied to its overseas departments (e.g. 
Balme and Jouve, 1996). The Régions have each their own regional council with a regional 
president whose political jurisdiction falls within its regional frontiers. In regards to the French 
Outermost Regions, it is only the DOMs the only outermost regions who have a regional council. 
The TOMs, on the other hand, have territorial councils with far fewer political competencies as 
their status is granted through a French organic act, not through constitutional guarantees.   
The Canary Islands of Spain 
 The Canary Islands are Spain’s sole Outermost Region. As an autonomous community, 
the Canary Islands have their own elected regional government with its own regional president as 
well as it sends representatives to both Madrid and Brussels. Since its formation as an 
autonomous community in 1982, Spain has historically recognized the Canary Islands’ insularity 
by providing tax exemptions (see Law 30/72 of 22 July 1972 on the Economic and Fiscal 
Regime (EFR)). As a result, the Canaries opted for a middle ground at the time of Spain’s 
accession to the EU. This “middle ground” of EU integration mostly consisted of political, rather 
than economic, integration to the EU. This meant that while the Canary Islands enjoyed political 
representation in both Madrid and Brussels, it was kept out of the European economy (Wehbe 
Herrera, 1999). It was not until 1991 when the Canary Islands became a fully integrated region in 
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the EU. In regards to their constitutional position, aside from their status of autonomous 
community, the Spanish constitution has also the responsibility to consult the Canary regional 
government in order to implement any modification on their economic and fiscal regime (see 
Additional Provision Number Three of the Spanish Constitution, 1978). 
Madeira and the Azores of Portugal  
 Madeira and the Azores were both granted legislative, political, and administrative 
autonomy in 1976 under Title VII of the Portuguese Constitution (see Title VII of the Portuguese 
Constitution, 1976). Unlike the rest of the Portuguese state, Title VII of the Portuguese 
Constitution provides an extensive list of the competences provided to both island regions, most 
of which fall under areas of political autonomy. Both Madeira and the Azores have each their 
own elected regional assemblies each with their own regional presidents. As part of their 
political autonomy, the Portuguese national government must work and consult with both 
Madeira and the Azores on their economic development (see article 229 of the Portuguese 
Constitution, 1976). On the other hand, their political autonomy could be seen to be quite limited 
in the sense that, unlike the Canary Islands and the French DOMs and TOMs, they are assigned a 
national representative to serve as a liaison to Portugal (see article 230 of the Portuguese 
Constitution, 1976). Despite the granting of political and economic competencies, Title VII does 
not grant them the power to participate in international affairs as well as it grants the Portuguese 
Republic the power to dissolve both assemblies (see article 234 of Portuguese Constitution, 
1976). 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter we have seen the changing nature of the Outermost Regions’ relationship 
with both the EU and their respective member states. Comparing their relationship with both 
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levels of government one can see that although their constitutional position has evolved 
throughout the years, it has been only in EU treaties in which policy has been applied to them in 
a uniform manner. When examining their relationship and constitutional evolution within their 
member states, one can see that they have gradually been granted political autonomy with their 
own regional elected assemblies. The degree of granted political autonomy, however, is varied 
depending on the member state and the political competencies granted. 
 Tying this to the thesis’s overarching research question, it is important to mention the 
Outermost Regions’ relationship with both the EU and their respective member states as both 
levels of government have recognized their structural and economic handicaps which, in turn, 
has translated into specialized policy. Despite the implementation of specialized policy from 
both the EU and their member states, their impact among the Outermost Regions has been 
uneven with some economically benefitting more than others. The following chapter establishes 
a literature review on the Outermost Regions. This Literature Review, however, mostly focuses 
on the disciplines in which they have traditionally featured which has been in the field of 
economic development.  










CHAPTER 3: THE OUTERMOST REGIONS AND THE EU   
Literature on the Outermost Regions of the European Union has tended to focus on their 
integration to the EU as well as their development vis-à-vis the rest of the European continent 
(e.g. Wehbe Herrera, 1999; Dentinho, et al., 2001; Lorincz, 2011; Murray, 2012). Murray 
(2012), for instance, provides an extensive account on the evolution of the Outermost Regions’ 
political position in both EU treaties as well as their constitutional relationship within their 
member states. Throughout the chapter she also writes about the EU’s responsibilities towards 
the Outermost Regions’ development with the POSEI programs and how, ever since the passage 
of article 299(2) of the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU has taken a more proactive role in their 
development with the Commission’s Communications on the Outermost Regions (see COM 
(2004) 343, (2007) 507, (2012) 287, (2017) 623). Aside from recognizing their economic and 
social handicaps, the Communications have promoted for both their economic and social 
development through the use of structural funds. For instance, the Communications have 
provided detailed plans for the development of job creation, infrastructure, improvement of 
social services, as well as promoting relations with neighboring regions, particularly the ACP 
countries (see COM (2012) 287). The reason for this is due because of the EU’s recognition of 
their structural handicaps in which they are required to receive additional assistance. EU 
recognition of the Outermost Regions’ handicaps, on the other hand, have come as a result of the 
Outermost Regions’ mobilization within their respective member states as well as within the EU. 
These communications have also served as guide towards the EU in which to provide for 
additional economic assistance for the Outermost Regions when preparing for their structural 
funding period.     
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Lorincz (2011) provides a summary of the socio-economic challenges presented by the 
Outermost Regions as well as the EU’s challenges in integrating them to the rest of the Single 
Market. In his article, Lorincz argues about the Outermost Regions’ utility to the EU, despite the 
EU’s challenge in promoting their economic development (2011). Considering the Outermost 
Regions’ utility to the EU, they serve as an expansion of the EU’s jurisdiction throughout the 
globe which have helped pave the way to the establishment of diplomatic ties to regions such as 
Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean (ACP) countries (2011). In addition, given that most of 
the Outermost Regions are located in tropical regions, their warm climate and geographic 
location prove ideal for the development of tourism, blue economy, as well as niche industries 
such as the European Space Station in Guyana, and the Institute of Astrophysics in the Canary 
Islands (see COM (2007) 507). On the other hand, the Outermost Regions present a set of 
challenges to the EU. Because of their proximity to the African continent, as well as the 
Caribbean, and Latin America, the Outermost Regions often serve as a gateway to Europe and 
have been a source of undocumented migration to the European continent (Lorincz, 2011). In 
terms of socio-economic development, the Outermost Regions are often well below the EU 
average. For instance, they tend to have higher levels of unemployment, school dropouts, 
emigration to the European continent, as well as crime rates (Lorincz, 2011: see also COM 
(2007) 507). Hence, the reason for the Commission’s Communication on their Strategic 
Partnership. These Communications, however, most often do not take into account the political 
role of the Outermost Regions in the implementation of EU policy. Although the Commission’s 
Communications often call for their inclusion in the implementation of policy, the fact of the 
matter lies in that their inclusion for the implementation of policy often rests on their respective 
members states.   
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Although Murray (2012) provides a detailed account of the Outermost Regions’ 
institutional relations at both the EU and member state level of government, Wehbe Herrera 
(1999) details the Canary Islands’ road towards EU integration up until the passage of article 
299(2) of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. While each of the Outermost Regions have varying 
levels of political autonomy within their respective member states, they each also took different 
routes towards integration into the EU. While the French overseas territories and departments 
were initially included in the founding, as well as subsequent EU treaties; Madeira and the 
Azores opted for full integration into the EU at the time of Portugal’s accession. The story was 
different with the Canary Islands at the time of Spain’s accession to the EU. Prior to Spain’s 
accession, the Spanish government already recognized the Canaries’ insular condition with its 
law on Economic and Fiscal Regime (EFR) in 1972 (see Ley 30/72). Because of their fiscal 
position, the Canaries opted for a middle road in European integration in which they underwent a 
“political” rather than “economic” integration (1999). While they obtained political 
representation, they were initially excluded out of the Customs Union, the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), as well as the Value Added Tax (VAT). In 
addition, seeing that many of their exports were considered ‘third country’ exports and that the 
perceived benefits of economic exemptions did not bring about the expected benefits, 
mobilization occurred towards full integration into the EU (Wehbe Herrera, 1999). The Canaries’ 
shift towards full integration took place in 1989 with a proposal being made for full integration 
with specificities and the application of the POSEICAN program in 1991. Shortly thereafter, the 
Canaries, alongside the rest of the Outermost Regions, led the initiative towards EU recognition 
of their developmental handicaps. Out of these initiatives was the lobbying for their recognition 
of their ultraperipheral status, which later led to article 299(2) of the Amsterdam Treaty. Wehbe 
21 
 
Herrera (1999) argues that the reason for the Canaries’ lobbying towards a special recognition 
for the Outermost Regions was due out of concern of increased globalization, the impact of the 
economic and monetary union, as well as the, then, upcoming Eastern enlargement in which 
funding could have potentially been diverted from them in favor of the Eastern European states. 
Despite the Canary Islands’ motives, the fact of the matter was that Wehbe Herrera (1999) 
provides a picture of subnational mobilization through the use of the EU’s institutional channels.           
Seeing how the Canaries, among the Outermost Regions, have taken the forefront in EU 
affairs, Tuñón (2008) explains how they have mobilized and used the EU’s institutions in the 
securing of structural funds. Unlike Wehbe Herrera (1999), Tuñón (2008) has used both “Third 
Level” as well as multilevel governance to explain the Canaries’ developmental success. 
Nevertheless, a number of variables are needed to be taken into consideration. For instance, 
scholars on multilevel governance argue that despite the EU’s decentralization and granting of 
regional participation in its institutions, regions from federal or decentralized member states have 
had the most success in the securing of structural funds (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2001; Hooghe, 
2005; Bache, 2008). This variation in success, Marks argues, is due to the level of regional 
government participation within the different stages of structural programming (Marks, 1996; 
Hooghe and Marks, 2001). As a result, the greater the level of involvement within the different 
stages of structural programming, the greater the success the region has in securing structural 
funds. As a Spanish autonomous community, the Canaries have taken both a proactive role by 
mobilizing in the EU’s institutions as well as lobbying for increased funding in the Commission 
(Tuñón, 2008a). Their recognition as an Outermost Region, on the other hand, means that the EU 
has the responsibility to provide for their social and economic development, a phenomenon not 
necessarily seen in other regions (see article 349 of the Lisbon Treaty). While Tuñón (2008) 
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provides a good explanation on regional mobilization and the Canaries’ use of EU and member 
state institutions, he does not provide a detailed explanation on the Canaries’ involvement in the 
securing of structural funds. On the other hand, his work provides additional proof that regions 
from federal and decentralized states are often more involved in regional mobilization than 
regions from more centralized states.   
Focusing on the role of Portugal and its Outermost Regions, Freitas (2017) provides an 
updated summary on the evolution of the Outermost Regions’ position within the treaties of the 
EU. At the time of the article’s publication, however, a number of events must be taken into 
consideration. On the one hand, passage of the Lisbon Treaty, with its articles 349 and 355, 
brought along a series of amendments to the EU’s responsibility towards its Outermost Regions. 
On the other hand, the Commission once again reiterated its commitment towards the 
development of its Outermost Regions with its 2012 Communication. In her article, Freitas 
(2017) provides a summary of the main points established by the Commission’s 2012 
communication on its Outermost Regions, particularly on its developmental priorities. As in 
most of the literature on the Outermost Regions, Freitas (2017) also provides a summary of the 
Outermost Regions’ developmental challenges as well as the benefits they serve to the EU as a 
whole. In regards to the benefits to the EU, Freitas (2017) talks about the Outermost Regions’ 
closeness to the ACP countries, its biodiversity, as well as developmental potential through the 
promotion of diversified and knowledge-based economies (see also COM (2012) 287). In 
regards to the role of Portugal towards its Outermost Regions, Freitas only presents evidence of 
the Portuguese government’s support of a common strategy towards the Outermost Regions in 
general for the upcoming 2017 communication. Despite brief mention of Portugal’s support, 
most of the article focuses on the EU’s action towards its Outermost Regions’ as most 
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Commission Communications tend to focus on. Despite the article’s emphasis on the Outermost 
Regions of Portugal, Freitas (2017) does not make any reference to either Madeira nor the 
Azores’ political mobilization in support of their socio-economic development.   
Writing immediately following the passage of the Amsterdam Treaty, Dentinho, et al. 
(2001) provide a series of policy recommendations in regards to the management of the 
Ultraperipheral Regions of the EU. In their article they define the concept of ultraperipherality as 
“an economic and social phenomenon associated to a geographical structure characterized by 
size and distance” (Dentinho, et al., 2001). However, they use two particular variables when 
comparing the ultraperipheral territories to other types of territories: size and access (Dentinho, 
et al., 2001). They argue that when compared to other types of territories such as central, 
peripheral, and marginal territories, ultraperipheral territories have neither size or accessibility to 
help develop their economies and, as a result, they become dependent on developmental aid 
(2001). Despite increased European policies on the development of the ultraperipheral regions, 
they have not been able to decrease the ultraperipheral regions’ underdevelopment (Dentinho, et 
al., 2001). As a result, they provide a number of measures for the management of 
ultraperipherality. These measures propose intervention of communication and transportation 
systems for the accessibility of the regions; improve the competitiveness of export value chains; 
and modulate the information and decision systems that influence the mechanisms that control 
and distribute value. In their proposed model they argue that with the combined effects of these 
measures the ultraperipheral regions could begin a sustained process of development (Dentinho, 
et al., 2001). As a means of providing evidence, Dentinho, et al. (2001) provide brief case studies 
in which they prove how these policies have led to increased, albeit low, development in each of 
the ultraperipheral regions. They measure developmental growth using a set of economic 
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variables such as employment, unemployment, as well as GDP growth. After providing evidence 
of their developmental growth they then proceed to establish a series of policy recommendations 
for both the EU as well as the member states towards their development. Most of their 
recommendations lie on the liberalization of their economies coupled with the abolishing of 
mercantilist practices. Despite their recommendations, as well as evidence, of the Outermost 
Regions’ development, Dentinho, et al. (2001) do not take into consideration the role of the 
Outermost Regions in the establishment of developmental policy.  
As in most of the literature on the Outermost Regions, the bulk of the responsibility 
towards their development is often placed on both the EU and their respective member states 
(e.g. Murray, 2012; Wehbe Herrera, 1999; Lorincz, 2011; Tuñón, 2008; Freitas, 2017; Dentinho, 
et al., 2001). Despite this necessary measure for their economic growth and development, as well 
as their recognition of their developmental handicaps, literature on the Outermost Regions hardly 
makes any mention of their role in EU decision-making, nor do they establish a clear theoretical 
framework when explaining their mobilization within both the EU and their member states. As 
has been stated throughout the literature review, the Outermost Regions’ position within the EU 
is currently dictated by articles 349 and 355 of the Lisbon Treaty alongside the Commission’s 
Communication on partnerships with the Outermost Regions. Only in Tuñón (2008) and Wehbe 
Herrera (1999) do we see any instance of the Outermost Regions mobilizing at both the national 
and EU levels of government as a means of influencing EU policy-making. Of the two authors, 
Tuñón (2008) has been the only scholar to apply multilevel governance theory as a means to 
explaining the Canary Islands’ mobilization within the EU.  
The following chapter provides a more detailed explanation of multilevel governance 
theory. As a theoretical framework, multilevel governance has been applied as a means to 
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explain the rise in European regionalism, subnational mobilization through the use of the EU’s 
institutions, the decentralization of member states, as well as cohesion policy (e.g. Hooghe and 
Marks, 2001). Given the numerous political phenomena in which multilevel governance has been 
applied, aside from explaining multilevel governance as a theoretical framework, the following 
chapter also provides a literature review on multilevel governance as a means to tie it with the 



































CHAPTER 4: INTRODUCTION TO MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE 
 
The theoretical framework most appropriate to answer the research question is multilevel 
governance theory. As a theoretical framework, multilevel governance emerged as an alternative 
theory to the dominant theories on European integration: intergovernmentalism and 
neofunctionalism. A term brought forward by Gary Marks (1992), multilevel governance argues 
that although national governments continue to be the main actors within the European Union, 
increased integration has brought to the fore EU institutions, regional and subnational 
governments, as well as non-governmental institutions, as actors in government decision-
making. As a theory on European integration, multilevel governance emerged as a result of a 
number of institutional reforms that took place in the mid-1980s (Marks 1992; Hooghe, 1996; 
Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Jeffery, 1997; 2000; Bache, 2008, Baun & Tarek, 2014). This chapter 
focuses on multilevel governance as the thesis’s theoretical framework. However, because of its 
different applications to numerous EU integration phenomena, this chapter is divided into two 
sections. The reason for the application of multilevel governance as the thesis’s theoretical 
framework is due because all three levels of government, EU, national, and regional, often 
mobilized or are consulted when implementing policy or establishing budgets for programming 
periods.  
The first section focuses on a brief historical background on the events that led to the 
creation of multilevel governance as a theory on European integration. The second section 
focuses on a literature review and its numerous applications in several EU integration 
phenomena. Such applications include member state decentralization, subnational mobilization 
and Cohesion Policy. Because Cohesion Policy is the area of interest of this thesis, special focus 
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is given on the application of multilevel governance in this area of European integration in the 
following chapter.  
Historical Origins of Multilevel Governance Theory 
It is generally agreed upon that the main institutional change that set forth multilevel 
governance was the passage of the Single European Act (SEA) which marked the beginning of 
the process of market integration in the EU (e.g. Hooghe, 1996; Bullmann, 1997). On the other 
hand, it was the 1988 reform on structural funds alongside the establishment of Partnership 
Agreements that direct connections between the Commission and regional governments initially 
came to the fore of European policy-making (Hooghe, 1996; Bache, 1998). Further member state 
decentralization came along with the passage of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the creation 
of the Committee of the Regions in 1994 paving the way towards increased subnational 
participation in the EU. Article 146 of the Maastricht Treaty allowed for the participation of 
regional ministers in the Council of Ministers while chapter 4 of the treaty allowed for the 
creation of the Committee of the Regions (see article 146 and chapter 4 of the Maastricht Treaty, 
1992). Despite these initial institutional reforms, regional participation in both the Council of 
Ministers and the Committee of the Regions initially occurred in the EU’s federal or highly 
decentralized member states (Marks, et al., 1996).   
As part of the Partnership Agreement, the Commission, alongside the member state and 
the region in question, are jointly consulted in regards to the implementation of the structural 
funds. The 1988 reform also undertook a general review of the system of coordination and 
decision-making in EC regional policy. The new regulation introduced a three-sided partnership 
of Commission, member states, and regional authorities in drawing up, financing, and 
monitoring Community Support Frameworks (CSFs) (Nanetti, 1996). Thus, representatives from 
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regional governments are included in a ‘legally mandated direct dialogue’, in which the 
Commission explores funding priorities (Marks, 1992: 211). Since the implementation of these 
reforms, member states have had to negotiate in both directions, European and subnational levels 
of government (ibid.). With each subsequent reform on structural funds, the EU has granted 
broader measures of liberalization and political inclusion to different political sectors such as 
subnational governments, and nongovernmental organizations (Bache, 1998; Baun and Marek, 
2014: 146-177). This meant that member states were then required to decentralize their 
governmental structures and even establish regions where they have had no tradition in regional 
government (Nanetti, 1996; Bache, 2008). It was this initial member state decentralization and 
the EU’s granting of regional participation to its regions that led scholars to conceive multilevel 
governance as a theoretical framework (e.g. Bullmann, 1997; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Hooghe, 
1996).   
Application of Multilevel Governance as an Explanation to Member State Decentralization and 
Subnational Mobilization  
 
It has been argued that the increase in European integration immediately following 
passage of the Single European Act also led to an increase in European subnational mobilization 
(e.g. Hooghe, 1995; Bullmann, 1997; Jeffery 1997; 2000). In line with the general consensus on 
Partnership Agreements, Hooghe (1995), for instance, argues that the 1988 reform on structural 
funds made the EU acquire the features of a federation. The reason for such comparison stems 
from the fact that regional governments can now establish direct connections with the 
Commission with or without the presence of national representatives. It is with this regional 
contact with the Commission that regional, or subnational, governments seized the opportunity to 
establish contact through a number of different institutions (Hooghe and Marks, 1996; Bomber 
and Peterson, 1998).  
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Hooghe and Marks (1996) establish a list of subnational governments’ institutional 
channels to the EU. In their article, they number the EU’s different institutional channels as well 
as elaborate on the regional government’s use and overall impact of their regional mobilization. 
Of the institutions in their article, Hooghe and Marks write about the regional governments’ use 
of the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the Committee of the Regions, as well as non-
institutional channels such as subnational offices and transnational institutions (Hooghe and 
Marks, 1996; see also Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 81-92). Their research question is: “to what 
extent do these channels empower subnational governments, and, in particular, regional actors 
within the European Union?” (1996). They argue that while institutional changes brought 
subnational actors directly into the European arena, the national state still provides important 
arenas for subnational influence and the participation of regional governments at the European 
level reflects their institutional capacity within their political systems (Hooghe and Marks, 1996; 
Marks, 1996). They conclude that a regional government’s success in EU policy-making is 
tantamount to two main variables: the institution’s political power and the regional government’s 
level of political autonomy. Because the Commission is the institution in charge of the 
implementation of regional policy, regional governments are often involved lobbying in support 
of increased structural funding (1996). Among the EU’s least influential channels, Hooghe and 
Marks (ibid.) argue that it is the Committee of the Regions the institution in which subnational 
actors exert the least amount of influence given that its role is limited to a consulting role and 
seat appointment in the Committee of the Regions oftentimes depended on the member states. In 
regards to the Council of Ministers, subnational influence is somewhat mixed given that regional 




As evidence of Hooghe and Marks’s (1996; 2001: 81-92) article on regional channels to 
Europe, Bomberg and Peterson (1998) focus on the regions of the United Kingdom, the Lander 
in Germany, and their use of institutional and non-institutional decision-making institutions in 
the EU. Like Hooghe and Marks (1996; 2001: 81-92), they survey their use of the Commission, 
Committee of the Regions, Council of Ministers, as well as the establishment of regional offices 
in Brussels (Bomberg and Peterson, 1998). Unsurprisingly, their article concludes that between 
the UK’s regions and the German Lander, the German Lander has had better success in securing 
structural funds (1998). The reason for the Lander’s success, Bomber and Peterson (1998) argue, 
is due to the fact that as federal units, they have the political capacity to mobilize in both the 
national and EU level of government whereas the regions in the UK are often subject to national 
intervention.     
 While an increase in member state political decentralization has led to an increase in 
regional and subnational political mobilization, scholars on multilevel governance have also 
sought to look for explanations as to why heads of states diffuse authority at both the EU and 
regional levels of government (Marks, 1997; Hooghe and Marks, 2001). In his chapter 
contribution, Marks asks the following research question: “why would those in positions of 
authority within national states agree to shift decision-making from central state institutions to 
subnational or supranational institutions?” (Marks, 1997; see also Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 69-
80). He states that there are three main reasons as to why national governments disperse political 
authority. The first reason as to why a state government disperses political power is made as a 
means to shift responsibility of decisions to sub-national or supra-national actors (Marks, 1997: 
25). The second reason is due to the fact that not doing so may entail worst consequences for the 
state government. Finally, government leaders may be unable to check or reverse the dispersal of 
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political authority (1997: 27). One such example has been precisely each reform on structural 
funds as well as passage of EU treaties. The reason why member states may be unable to check 
or reverse the dispersal of political authority is due to the fact that with each passage of EU 
treaties, in addition to each reform on structural funds, European integration has further 
increased with European institutions increasing their political competencies and subnational 
governments, as well as non-governmental institutions also becoming viable political actors.          
Bache (2008), on the other hand, provides a definition to the concept of 
“Europeanization”. Focusing on the United Kingdom as his main case study, Bache defines 
Europeanization as the reorientation or reshaping of politics in the domestic arena in ways that 
reflect policies, practices, or preferences advanced through the EU system of governance (Bache, 
2008, as cited in Bache and Jordan, 2006c: 30). Despite his main focus on the UK, Bache’s 
research focuses on whether EU Cohesion Policy has promoted multilevel governance in other 
member states and assesses whether any identified governance change can be characterized as a 
process of Europeanization. Bache’s categorization consists of two distinct categories, simple 
and compound polities, each placed at opposing sides of a spectrum (2008: 3). He defines simple 
polities as states with a combination of a majoritarian system while defining compound polities 
as states with a combination of a proportional representation system and regionalized structures 
(ibid.). The EU and the member states are then placed on a continuum between simple and 
compound polity. It is by studying the effects of Cohesion Policy that one can determine whether 
Europeanization has had an effect in the member states that caused them to move throughout the 
spectrum, particularly towards the formation of a compound polity. These particular changes can 
be said to have held true in member states like Portugal, Greece, Sweden, and Finland, in which 
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as a result of reform on structural funds, were forced to implement measures on political 
decentralization (Bache, 2008: 58-71).        
Conclusion 
 This chapter focused on providing an introduction to multilevel governance as a theory 
and its application as a means to explaining member state decentralization and subnational 
mobilization. A theoretical framework originally conceived by Gary Marks (1992), multilevel 
governance argues that although national governments continue to be the main actors within the 
European Union, increased integration has brought to the fore EU institutions, regional and 
subnational governments, as well as non-governmental institutions as actors in government 
decision-making. This has come as the result of events such as the passage of the Single 
European Act, the 1988 reform on structural funds, and the passage of the Maastricht Treaty, 
each of which established new funding mechanisms and institutions to which regional 
governments can exert their political influence (e.g. Marks, 1992; Bache, 1998).   
Despite the scholarly consensus that increased European integration has opened the door 
to regional and subnational mobilization, the regional governments’ mobilization and impact in 
EU decision-making has been conditional to the member states’ degree of political 
decentralization (e.g. Hooghe and Marks, 1996; Bomber and Peterson, 1998). In other words, 
regions in member states with highly centralized governments tend to mobilize less and exert 
less political influence than regions from federal member states (e.g. Bomber and Peterson, 
1998; Hooghe and Marks, 1996). Nevertheless, the recent EU revisions have made even the most 
highly centralized states exert measures of political decentralization (Bache, 2008). While this 
chapter sought to provide a historical background and application of multilevel governance in 
member state decentralization and regional mobilization, greater explanation should be given to 
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the motives as to why regions within the EU mobilize and seek to exert their influence in EU 
affairs. It is argued that the main reason for regional mobilization within the EU is due to exert 
influence in regards to Cohesion Policy (Baun and Marek, 2014). Because Cohesion Policy was 
one of the areas in which Multilevel Governance was applied as well as the focus of this thesis, 
the following chapter provides greater detail into the application of multilevel governance in 




















CHAPTER 5: APPLICATION OF MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE 
 IN COHESION POLICY 
 
Cohesion Policy was one of the first areas in which multilevel governance was first 
theorized and tested (Baun and Marek, 2014). Like the event scholars believe to have caused the 
birth of multilevel governance, the passage of the Single European Act, Cohesion Policy was 
born following the 1988 reform on structural funds (Bache, 2008; Nanetti, 1996; Baun and 
Marek, 2014). It is argued that the reason for the implementation of Partnership Agreements was 
due because Cohesion Policy required the existence of competent regional authorities that could 
be partners of the Commission and national governments in the administration of structural funds 
(Baun and Marek, 2014: 159). As a result, Cohesion Policy also empowered subnational actors 
by providing them with new financial resources by establishing direct links with EU institutions 
and encouraging the formation of transnational associations by regional and local governments, 
thus providing them with new means for promoting their interests (Baun and Marek, 2014: 162). 
Cohesion Policy operates through the programmed use of structural funds: European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund (ESF), and the Cohesion Fund. The amounts 
dedicated to the various structural funds, and thus the financial envelope for cohesion, are 
decided on a multi-annual basis, in negotiations between the member states on multi-annual 
budgetary or financial frameworks (Hooghe, 1996). 
As contributing authors in Hooghe’s book on Cohesion Policy and European Integration 
(1996), Wishlade (1996: 27-58) and Nanetti (1996: 59-87) each provide a historical background 
on EU Cohesion Policy. Wishlade provides an initial background on the origins of European 
Regional Policy beginning in 1975 with the initial implementation of the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) up until the second reform on Structural Funds in 1993 (Wishlade, 
1996: 27-58). With the 1988 reform on structural funds, she provides an explanation consisting 
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of six original objectives (1996: 33). These six priority objectives were: objective 1, 
underdeveloped regions; objective 2, regions in industrial decline; objective 3, long-term 
unemployment; objective 4, youth unemployment; objective 5a, adaptation of agricultural 
structures; and objective 5b, development of rural areas (ibid.: 33-39). However, based on these 
priorities, policy was primarily implemented through a three-stage process. The first involving 
the submission of development plans by national and regional authorities; the second, the 
drafting of Community Support Frameworks (CSFs); and thirdly, the approval of Operational 
Programs (ibid.: 34). Wishlade also provides a summary of the 1993 reform on Structural Policy 
which brought an increase in structural fund resources; the extension of the programming period 
to six years; as well as a new objective 4 (1996: 48). The 1993 structural policy reform came a 
year after passage of the Maastricht Treaty which expanded the Commission’s role in Cohesion 
Policy requiring to submit a report every three years on their economic and social cohesion 
(Baun and Marek, 2014). The 1993 reform also established the Cohesion Fund, which was 
designed to help poorer member states with a per capita GDP below 90 percent of the EU 
average. It provided 85 per cent of project costs which were not initially programmed together 
with the structural funds (Wishlade, 1996). Unlike the other structural funds, the Cohesion Fund 
was solely controlled by the member state government in its appointment and application.  
Nanetti (1996: 59-88), on the other hand, focuses on EU Cohesion Policy and the 
subsequent member state territorial restructuring. In her chapter contribution, Nanetti attempts to 
explain “who are the main institutional actors in the development and implementation of the 
community’s cohesion policy, and how is such policy being shaped, in terms of both process and 
outputs?” (Nanetti, 1996: 60). She begins the chapter by providing a comparison on EU regional 
policy prior to the passage of the Single European Act and its subsequent 1988 reform on 
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structural funds (Nanetti, 1996: 60-69). As with most of the academic literature on multilevel 
governance and Cohesion Policy, Nanetti mostly reiterates the institutional changes in regional 
policy brought about by the aforementioned events. Of these being member state political 
decentralization and the strengthening of regional governments within the bloc (ibid.). However, 
one concept Nanetti (1996) does explain is the concept of Community Support Frameworks 
(CSFs). These are defined as a multi-year plan articulated in specific ‘measures’, jointly agreed 
upon the Commission, member state, and the region (1996: 69). The final agreed-upon project of 
the development plan and region becomes the CSF, which then becomes articulated into multi-
year Operational Programs (OPs) (ibid.). 
 It must be emphasized that Nanetti was writing up until the establishment of the 1993-
1999 programming period. Bache briefly touches upon the application of the 2000-2006 period 
in which he establishes a background and subsequent reforms (Bache, 2008: 39-53). Bache 
(2008) argues that by 1999, the Commission was already preparing itself for future enlargement 
with the accession of the Central and Eastern European states (CEES). The challenge with the 
upcoming enlargement was that the Central and Eastern European states had an average GDP of 
typically one-third of the EU average (Bache, 2008: 44). As a result, the EU had to secure 
member state agreement for a reduction in the structural fund allocation to facilitate enlargement 
and agree to measures to develop the institutional capacity and capabilities that would allow 
them to deal with large-scale structural funding effectively (ibid.). On the other hand, it is Baun 
and Marek who provide a detailed explanation on the establishment, negotiation, as well as 
implementation of the 2006 reform on Cohesion Policy and its subsequent 2007-2013 
programming period (Baun and Marek, 2014). However, because the 2007-2013 programming 
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period consist of the thesis’s timeline, much more detail is given to this programming period in 
the following chapter.  
Explaining Variation in Cohesion Policy  
Hooghe and Marks also write about the role of Cohesion Policy in multilevel governance, 
particularly about the variation in results (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 93-104; see also Marks, 
1996: 388-422). They argue that the reason for variation in Cohesion Policy is due to the 
member states’ inclusion of their regions in the decision-making process of the structural funds 
(Marks, 1996). In their chapter on Cohesion Policy, they provide a road map on its different 
phases of policy-making. While the first two phases consist of creating the budget, and the 
designing of institutions respectively, it is the third phase that is focused on structural 
programming which also involves subnational governments. The third phase itself is divided into 
4 different stages each of which involve subnational governments in varying degrees.  
The first stage involves the formulation of national or regional development plans; the 
second stage, negotiations between the member states and the Commission; the third stage, the 
creation of operational programs; and finally, the fourth stage involves the implementation and 
monitoring of operational programs (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 99-102). They argue that out of 
the four stages of the structural programming phase, subnational governments exert the most 
influence at the fourth stage, then followed by the third, first, and second stage respectively 
(ibid.). Despite this observation, the reason for the variation in Cohesion Policy is due to the 
relative strength of subnational governments at each of the four stages of structural 
programming. Because structural programming is formulated and implemented at the member 
state level of government, as a consequence, it reflects the wide variations in territorial relations 
in the EU.     
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As a means of measuring the member states’ political autonomy, Hooghe and Marks 
create a table based on four criteria yielding a twelve-point index of regional governance (ibid: 
193-194). The Regional Governance table is based on four sets of variables consisting of 
constitutional federalism, constitutional or legal provisions relating to regional governance in the 
state as a whole; special territorial autonomy, constitutional or legal provisions for home rule in 
special territories; role of regions in central government, extent of regional power-sharing in 
central government; and regional elections, direct or indirect elections of regional assemblies. 
For each of the columns, Hooghe and Marks categorize each member state according to a value 
scale. In the first column, for instance, the scale ranges from (0), unitary state, to a full federal 
state (4). The in-between values assigned to each of the member states consist of the degree of 
regional autonomy granted. For instance, (1) consists of a member state with an existing regional 
tier of government; (2) consists of a regionalist state whose regions have extensive and 
specialized competencies; and (3) consists of a federal state whose regions are defined by a 
constitutionally guaranteed high level of political, administrative, and financial autonomy.  
The other three variables measured on the table also rely on a numeric scale according to 
a value scale (2001:193-194). When measuring special territorial autonomy, they rely on a (0-2) 
numeric scale with (0) consisting of a lack in any special autonomy arrangement; (0.5) consisting 
of weak authoritative competencies; (1) consisting of extensive authoritative competencies such 
as taxation; and (2) consisting of a special territorial autonomy covering over 10 percent of the 
population (ibid.: 200). When to comes to the role of the regions in central government, the 
numeric scale consists of a (0-4) scale measuring both legislative power sharing and executive 
power sharing. When focusing on power sharing arrangements, they attribute (1) for states with 
regional representation in the national legislature but no veto power; and (2) for states with 
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regional representation with veto power. The scale for executive power sharing consists of (1) 
for intergovernmental meetings between the regional and central executives but without the 
authority to reach binding decisions; and (2) for member states whose regional and central 
executives can reach binding decisions. For the measurement of the role of the regions in the 
central government, they add each of the values from both the legislative and executive scales 
(ibid.: 203). In regards to regional elections, Hooghe and Marks apply (1) for regions with 
indirectly elected regional assemblies; and (2) for regions with directly elected regional 
assemblies. 
The thesis’s research question is based on Marks’s table on Political Influence in 
Structural Programming, 1989-1993 (Marks, 1996: 407; see also Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 
100). Marks (1996) argues that although Cohesion Policy was designed to decrease regional 
inequalities across the EU, its impact has been varied throughout the bloc. The reason for such 
variation is due to the level of political influence subnational governments hold throughout the 
different stages of structural programming. As a means of measuring political influence, Hooghe 
and Marks first define the concept as “the relative capacity of an actor to shape policy outcome” 
while defining policy outcomes as “substantive allocation of resources and the allocation of 
decisional competencies” (ibid.: 104). In the table, Marks divides the political influence of actors 
by central government, regional governments, local governments, and the European 
Commission. Following the divisions, he then determines the strength of each governmental tier 
across each implementation stage whether the political influence is significant, weak, moderate, 
or strong (Marks, 1996: 407; see also Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 100).  
Taking a more descriptive approach, Marks mostly relies on the information provided by 
the previous case study chapters in Hooghe’s edited book Cohesion Policy and European 
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Integration (1996). Among the variables taken for the chart, he focuses on factors such as the 
extent to which the central executive is reliant upon information provided by the subnational 
government throughout the different stages of structural programming. In order to arrive at this 
conclusion, Marks relies on primary sources consisting of the Community Support Frameworks 
(CSF) and Operational Programs (OP) from the member states studied. In addition to the 
Regional Autonomy Index, whose information was obtained from member states’ constitutional 
arrangements and organic laws, other variables involved were also the role of party politics 
between the national and subnational levels of government as well as the financial role of the 
Commission (Marks, 1996: 409, 413). 
Conclusion 
 Cohesion Policy became one of the first areas in which multilevel governance was 
applied and tested (Baun and Marek, 2014). The reason for this is due because through the 
Partnership Agreement, Cohesion Policy required the existence of regional authorities that could 
establish links with both the Commission and the national governments. As a result, Cohesion 
Policy provided regional and subnational governments with the tools to establish direct links 
with the EU as well as among other regions within the EU. 
On the other hand, while Cohesion Policy was designed to bridge the gap between rich 
and poor regions in the EU, its effects among the member states has been varied. It has been 
argued that the reason for the variation is due to the regions’ involvement within the different 
stages of structural programming (Marks, 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 93-104). In other 
words, regions from federal or decentralized member states tend to be more involved in the 
negotiation and implementation of structural funds than regions from more centralized member 
states. As a result, regions from federal and decentralized member states benefit more from 
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Cohesion Policy. However, because the regions’ political autonomy is used as a variable for the 
success of this regions, Marks defines this variable as a function of the constitutional character of 
the state (Marks, 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2001, 93-104). In other words, the more 
constitutional competencies a region has, the more autonomous it is. Most of the literature 
focusing on variations in Cohesion Policy takes the 1989-1993 programming period as their 
timeline (e.g. Marks, 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 93-104). This thesis, on the other hand, 
takes the 2007-2013 programming period as its timeline. However, because each subsequent 
programming period has implemented changes in the negotiation and implementation of 
structural funds, the following chapter provides a background of the characteristics of the 2007-


















CHAPTER 6: THE 2006 REFORM ON COHESION POLICY 
 This chapter focuses on providing a general background on the origins as well as the 
characteristics of the 2006 reform on Cohesion Policy and its subsequent 2007-2013 
programming period. In addition to providing the characteristics of this programming period, this 
will also provide information about the criteria used by the EU to distribute and allocate regional 
funds based on the regions’ GDP levels.  
The end result of the 2006 EU Reform on Cohesion Policy, the 2007-2013 programming 
period is the timeline chosen for this thesis for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it is the 
most recent programming period to have taken place in which data is most readily available and 
results can be conclusively arrived at. It is also worth mentioning that the 2007-2013 
programming period took place right after the EU’s eastern enlargement. This meant that the 
distribution of structural funds had to be divided among the relatively poorer newer member 
states vis-à-vis the EU15 (Baun and Marek, 2014; Bachtler, et al., 2007).   
The focus of this chapter is to provide a brief historical background on the events leading 
to the 2006 Cohesion Policy Reform as well as its main features. The following section then 
focuses on the modifications and characteristics brought about the 2006 Reform on Cohesion 
Policy and its subsequent 2007-2013 programming period. Finally, given that this thesis focuses 
on the Outermost Regions of the EU, a summary on their categorizations on funding allocation is 
then detailed.   
Background to the 2006 Cohesion Policy Reform 
 Before the 2007-2013 Programming Period took place, as with previous programming 
periods, EU budget negotiations as well as cohesion policy reform took place prior to its 
implementation. The EU’s recent eastern expansion brought to the fore a series of challenges in 
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which to apply regional funds among its member states. The newly added member states all had 
a GDP per capita below the EU average of 90 percent when compared to the EU15 member 
states (Baun and Marek, 2014: 42). In addition, the EU set forth the ‘Lisbon Strategy’ in 2000 in 
which it set the basic goal of making the EU ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth and with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion’ (ibid.: 43). It also set forth a number of goals ranging from the 
improvement of high-tech infrastructure to the completion of the internal market in the areas of 
energy, communication, transportation networks, and services. In addition, it also set specific 
targets for 2010 which included an annual economic growth of 3 per cent of GDP; the creation of 
20 million jobs; as well as an overall employment rate of 70 per cent of (ibid.: 44). Despite the 
2010 deadline, the Lisbon Strategy became difficult to implement due to its high costs. Given the 
challenges faced within the EU’s wealthier member states pushing for tighter fiscal controls and 
poorer member states pushing for funding availability, the Commission proposed a number of 
proposals leading to the 2006 reforms on cohesion policy (ibid.: 90-95). 
Budgetary negotiations began in 2004 with the Commission originally proposing a total 
of 836.3 billion euro for the upcoming programming period with an allocation of 308.04 billion 
euro for structural funds (Bachtler, et al., 2007). This proposal, however, was met with 
considerable opposition from a number of member states and EU actors. After the failed attempt 
of the Luxembourg presidency in the first half of 2005 to establish an EU budget, it was up to the 
UK Council presidency to establish a budget for the upcoming 2007-2013 budgetary period 
(ibid.: 3). A full agreement on an established EU budget finally took place in April 2006 after 
three rounds of negotiations when an interinstitutional agreement arrived at a total budget of 
864.3 billion euro in which 308.04 billion euro was allocated to structural funds.  
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Among other proposals, the Commission also proposed a new architecture changing the 
former system of priority objectives. In addition, because of the EU’s goals in achieving the 
Lisbon Strategy, Cohesion Policy was ‘earmarked’ by linking EU assistance towards achieving 
the Lisbon Strategy. Lastly, the Commission also proposed for a simplification of the 
programming process (Baun and Marek, 2014: 49).  
Characteristics of the 2007-2013 Programming Period 
 Unlike previous programming periods, the 2006 Reform on Cohesion Policy brought 
about a series of changes in area designations as well as programming. As proposed by the 
Commission, the new regulations replaced previous priority objectives with three new priorities 
for cohesion spending: Convergence, Regional Competitiveness and Employment (RCE); and 
European Territorial Cooperation. The new Convergence objective replaced the former 
Objective 1 from previous programming periods and retained the traditional cohesion policy 
focus on ‘speeding up the convergence of the least developed member states and regions’ (Baun 
and Marek, 2014: 50). Allocation of funds for Convergence regions were allocated to regions 
whose GDP per capita in purchasing product standard (PPS) was less than 75 percent of the 
established EU 25 average from the years 2000-2002 (Bachtler, et al., 2007: 13). 
 Because this programming period brought along the poorer eastern member states, two 
new categories between Convergence and Regional Competitiveness and Employment were also 
created: Phasing-in and Phasing-out Regions. Phasing-Out Regions were regions still under the 
Convergence Objective whose GDP per capita in PPS was between 75 per cent of the EU25 and 
75 per cent of the EU15 average. Phasing-In regions, on the other hand, were regions that had 
outgrown their former Objective 1 status and are considered to be formally part of the Regional 
Competitiveness and Employment Regions. Formally Regional Competitiveness and 
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Employment Regions are simply regions that do not have Convergence, Phasing-in, or Phasing-
out status (Bachtler, et al., 2007). The European Territorial Cooperation, on the other hand, 
aimed at strengthening cross-border cooperation through joint local and regional initiatives 
(Baun and Marek, 2014: 54).  
 In their paper on the 2006 Reform on Cohesion Policy, Bachtler, et al. (2007) detail the 
allocation mechanisms for each of the objective regions. While most of the regional funds are 
applied to the Convergence Regions (81.5 per cent of the structural fund budget) which also 
includes Phasing-out regions. RCE and European Territorial Cooperation Regions, on the other 
hand, are granted 15.9 and 2.5 percent respectively (Bachtler, et al., 2007: 23). In regards to 
allocation mechanisms as to the assignment of structural funds, Convergence regions are 
allocated funds based on the Berlin formula taking into consideration the region’s disparities in 
GDP per capita, national prosperity, and high unemployment (ibid.: 25). For the Phasing-out and 
Phasing-in regions, the allocation of structural funds is based on the allocation of the previous 
year, 2006, at 80 and 75 per cent respectively with decreasing allocations each year in order for 
them to reach the per capita average of RCE regions (ibid.: 25-26). The allocation of funds for 
RCE regions, on the other hand, is based on a series of factors including population and 
unemployment. 
 When it comes to the programming process, Baun and Marek provide a detailed 
explanation on the changes brought about the 2006 Reform on Cohesion Policy (Baun and 
Marek, 2014: 124-126). Unlike past programming periods, the 2006 reform removed the use of 
Community Support Frameworks (CSFs) and introduced a new multilevel programming process 
consisting of: Community Strategic Guidelines (CSGs); National Strategic Reference 
Frameworks (NSRFs); and, finally, Operational Programs (OPs). The CSGs were adopted at the 
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EU level and identified the main priorities and principles for the use of Cohesion Policy 
assistance. These were done in consultation with the member states. After the approval of the 
CSG, each member state then developed its own NSRF in which it defined the main priorities 
and strategies for the use of Cohesion Policy funding that a member state was to receive in the 
2007-2013 programming period. The NSRF was to be applied to Convergence and RCE regions. 
Finally, Operational Programs were designed by national and regional bodies of the member 
states in accordance to the priorities and objectives established in the CSGs and relevant NSRFs. 
A notable aspect of this strategic approach was that during each of the implementation stages, 
every level of government within the EU was to be consulted (Baun and Marek, 2014; Bachtler, 
et al., 2007).   
The Outermost Regions’ Objective Areas within the 2007-2013 Programming Period     
 Given that this thesis focuses on the Outermost Regions of the EU, it would be necessary 
to provide a general background of their regional eligibility. Historically, the Outermost Regions 
have tended to be among the EU’s poorest and least economically developed regions. As a result, 
policy modifications taking into consideration their structural handicaps have been implemented 
at both the national and EU level (e.g. see Title VIII of the Spanish Constitution, 1978; Title VII 
of the Portuguese Constitution, 1976; Title XII of the Fifth French Constitution, 1958; see also 
article 229(2) of the Amsterdam Treaty, 1997). In regards to the 2007-2013 Programming 
Period, the Community Strategic Guidelines did not only establish proposals taking into 
consideration the Outermost Regions’ structural handicaps, the Spanish, French, and Portuguese 
NSRFs that derived from these guidelines were also granted an additional allocation for their 
respective Outermost Regions in addition to their Operational Programs (see e.g. Cadre de 
reference stratégique national-France 2007-2013 (2007): 70-78; Marco Estratégico Nacional de 
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Referencia de España 2007-2013 (2007): 146-150; National Strategic Reference Framework-
Portugal 2007-2013 (2007): 25).   
 At the time of the implementation of the 2006 Reform on Cohesion Policy and its new 
system of regional eligibility, it would have seemed that the Outermost Regions did not 
experience massive change in their classification. As with most regions belonging to the former 
Objective 1 regions, most of the Outermost Regions remained within the newly established 
Convergence Regions. This meant that their GDP per capita in purchasing power standard (PPS) 
were less than 75 percent of the EU25 average during the years 2000 to 2002. Among the 
Outermost Regions falling into the Convergence category are most of the French overseas 
territories of Martinique (74.88), French Guyana (56.76), Guadeloupe (67.32), and Réunion 
(60.63); and the Portuguese archipelago of the Azores (61.61). The only exceptions falling 
outside the Convergence classification are the Canary Islands (87.79) and Madeira (87.84) who 
both fell under the RCE Phasing-in classification. This means that although their GDP per capita 
in purchasing power standard is above 75 percent of the established EU25 average, their aid is 
slightly less generous with decreasing allocations set to aid them in reaching their national 
average in RCE allocation (Bachtler, et al., 2007: 26). 
Conclusion 
 This purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief background on the 2006 Reform on 
Cohesion Policy, its subsequent 2007-2013 Programming Period and how it applies to the 
Outermost Regions. Unlike past programming periods, the 2007-2013 period was characterized 
by an increase in member states and a reclassification of eligibility objectives. In addition, the 
2007-2013 programming period was also characterized by a simplification of its programming 
process by introducing Community Strategic Guidelines (CSGs), National Strategic Reference 
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Frameworks (NSRFs), yet maintaining the Operational Programs (OPs). It is also worth 
mentioning that unlike past programming processes, the programming process implemented for 
the 2007-2013 mandated for the inclusion and consultation of every EU government level 
through each implementation stage.  
When taking into consideration the Outermost Regions during the 2006 Cohesion Policy 
Reform, their recognition of their structural handicaps and policy accommodation is taken into 
account in all three stages of implementation: CSGs, respective member state NSRFs, as well as 
their respective OPs. As a result, additional funding is established as a means to deal with their 
structural handicaps. In regards to their allocation eligibility, most Outermost Regions fall under 
the Convergence objective, meaning that they are still considered to be among the least 
developed regions within the EU in terms of GDP per capita. The only exceptions are the Canary 

















CHAPTER 7: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 This thesis is a comparative research taking the EU’s Outermost Regions as its main case 
studies. Its overarching research question is: “Why are some regions economically successful, 
while others are not?” The literature on multilevel governance has stated that regions with high 
degrees of political autonomy have tended to be much more economically successful when 
compared to regions with little to no political autonomy (e.g. Bomberg and Peterson, 1998; 
Tuñón, 2008). A fund whose main purpose is to close the gap between rich and poor regions in 
Europe, literature on Cohesion Policy has often presented evidence of its effectiveness (Baun and 
Marek, 2014). One such example consists of the Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region in Portugal as 
it increased its GDP in previous structural programming periods (Nanetti, et al., 2004). Despite 
evidence of success in regions within continental Europe, little to no research has been carried 
out on its effects in regards to the Outermost Regions (e.g. Tuñón, 2008). In order to answer this 
overarching research question, it needs to be divided into two distinct research questions: 
Research question I: What is the effect of a region’s degree of political autonomy on its 
economic success? 
 
Research question II: What is the effect of EU structural funds on a region’s economic 
success? 
 
Economic “success”, in this case, is measured as the Outermost Regions’ growth in GDP per 
capita in purchasing power standards (PPS) towards the established EU28 average (EU28=100). 
This measure is precisely the one used in the EU’s Cohesion Policy towards its regions and, 
hence, the one chosen for this thesis. The reason for the EU’s use of GDP per capita in PPS is 
due because it represents a common currency that eliminates the differences in price levels 
between countries to allow meaningful volume comparisons of GDP between member states. In 
order to answer these questions, this thesis examines empirically the Outermost Regions of 
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France, Spain, and Portugal given that these are the only member states to hold Outermost, or 
Ultraperipheral, Regions at the EU Treaty level (see article 299(2) of the Amsterdam Treaty, 
1997). The reason for the selection of the Outermost Regions as the thesis’s case study is due to 
the fact that they are often considered to be among the EU’s most remote and economically 
poorer regions. As a result of their economic and structural handicaps, EU policy is oftentimes 
catered to address them through increased financial assistance (e.g. Lorincz, 2011). Amongst 
themselves, however, the Outermost Regions have varying levels of economic success despite 
the EU’s recognition of their distinct geographic position as well as economic challenges (see 
article 299(2) of the Amsterdam Treaty, 1997). In addition, their levels of political autonomy 
vary depending on their respective member state.  
 In regards to the chronological focus, the timeline consists of the 2007-2013 structural 
programming period. The reason for choosing this programming period is due to the fact that the 
EU is currently under the 2014-2020 programming period and, as a result, not enough 
information can be obtained to establish a firm conclusion on the Outermost Regions’ growth in 
GDP. The 2007-2013 structural funding period, on the other hand, provides the most recent 
completed period with the information in which to readily arrive at a conclusion.  
 The following sections focus on establishing and defining each of the independent 
variables for this thesis. For each section on the independent variables, I also establish how they 
are going to be measured as well as the method of data collection to be used. Afterwards, the 
following section then consists of establishing the thesis’s hypotheses based on the information 





Independent Variable I: Political Autonomy 
 This thesis uses Marks’s definition of government autonomy which he defines as a 
function of the constitutional character of the state (Marks, 1996: 406). In other words, the more 
constitutionally defined the region’s political, administrative, and financial competencies, the 
broader the region’s political autonomy. For instance, each of the member states’ constitutions 
while recognizing the particularities of their Outermost, as well as their historically distinct, 
Regions, have placed different types of political competencies for each of them. The third 
chapter of the Spanish Constitution, for example, contains an extensive list of the political as 
well as financial competencies reserved to both the autonomous communities and the Spanish 
state (see Chapter III of the Spanish Constitution, 1978). The same holds true in regards to the 
Portuguese Constitution whose Title VII establishes the competencies reserved for both Madeira 
and the Azores (see Title VII of the Portuguese Constitution, 1976). The Fifth French 
Constitution, on the other hand, while recognizing and differentiating its overseas collectivities 
from the rest of the metropolitan jurisdictions, does not establish a list of competencies with 
regards to their overseas departments (see Title XII and article 73 of the Fifth French 
Constitution, 1958).  
 In order to measure political autonomy, this thesis relies on Hooghe and Marks’s table on 
Regional Governance in the European Union, 1950-2000 (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 193-194). 
The table on Regional Governance in the European Union is based on four variables each with 
their own numeric scale: their degree of constitutional federalism (0-4); special territorial 
autonomy (0-2); the role of the regions in the central government (0-4); and regional elections 
(0-2). In order to measure these variables, Hooghe and Marks rely on a numeric scale for each of 
the variables measured and, as for data collection, they rely on the member states’ legal and 
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constitutional provisions as a means to prevent ambiguity. Hooghe and Marks, however, focus 
on the member state level of government and their constitutional arrangements in regards to their 
respective regions. If we were to replicate their table on Regional Governance to the Outermost 
Regions, the results would not be too different from what they originally stated. This thesis, 
however, focuses on the regional rather than the member state level of government.  
Beginning with the Canary Islands, as a Spanish autonomous community and only 
Outermost Region, the Spanish Constitution lists the competencies accorded to these political 
units (see Title VIII of the Spanish Constitution, 1978). Of these competencies, the autonomous 
communities are granted a series of political and economic competencies such as the formation 
and establishment of government as well as taxing competencies (see articles 152-158 of the 
Spanish Constitution, 1978). In regards to the Canary Islands, given its insularity and remoteness 
as an Outermost Region, both the Spanish government and its constitution have granted the 
archipelago a series of tax exemptions under the Economic and Fiscal Regime of 1972 (see 
Additional Disposition of the Spanish Constitution, 1978; see also Law 30/72 of 2 July 1972 on 
the Economic and Fiscal Regime). When it comes to the measure of the Canary Islands’ 
constitutionalism, it would be considered a (3) given its constitutionally guaranteed 
competencies as an autonomous community. In regards to its special territorial autonomy, it 
would be considered as a (1) given that unlike the more historic regions like Galicia, Catalonia, 
and the Basque Country, the Canaries do not have such recognition within the Spanish 
Constitution. When it comes to its role in regional governance, the Canary Islands would fall 
under the category (1) given its lack of veto power as well as its inability to reach binding 
decisions with the Spanish national government. Finally, the Canary Islands would be considered 
a (2) within the regional election scale given that they have a directly elected regional assembly.   
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Focusing on Madeira and the Azores, these are the only Portuguese regions to actually 
have a constitutionally recognized regional autonomy (see Title VII of the Portuguese 
Constitution, 1976). Although Portugal regionalized following its accession to the EU, only 
Madeira and the Azores have constitutionally established political competencies with the 
mainland regions only created for administrative purposes (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 198). 
When it comes to the Azores and Madeira’s classification within the table on Regional 
Governance in the European Union, on the scale on constitutional federalism it would be 
classified as (2) given that, unlike mainland Portugal, its political autonomy is constitutionally 
guaranteed (Title VII of the Portuguese Constitution, 1976). When it comes to their special 
territorial autonomy, they would be considered a (1) because even though their political 
autonomy is constitutionally guaranteed and their political competencies are numerous, the 
Portuguese state still controls the islands’ budget allocations (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 202; see 
also article 232 of the Portuguese Constitution, 1976). In regards to their role in the central 
government, both Madeira and the Azores would have an overall score of (2) given that their 
national legislatures are composed of members of the regions and regular intergovernmental 
meetings are held between both the Portuguese as well as the Madeiran and Azorean executives. 
However, both the Madeiran and Azorean representatives have neither extensive veto power nor 
can their executive establish binding decisions with the Portuguese national government. For 
regional elections, they would have an overall score of (2) since they both have a directly elected 
regional assembly.      
On the other hand, the status of French overseas departments grants these territories the 
status of both department and region. As regions, the overseas departments have their own 
elected assembly as well as representation in the French metropolitan government. It is for this 
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reason that this thesis focuses exclusively on the French overseas departments rather than the 
overseas territories as they are subject to French Organic Law, not the French Constitution. 
Given their status as an overseas department, French law is to be applied to these territories as to 
the rest of metropolitan France. The Fifth French Constitution, however, does recognize the 
insularity and remoteness present in the French overseas territories. As a result, French law is to 
be catered to their distinct realities vis-à-vis metropolitan France (see article 74 of the Fifth 
French Constitution, 1958). On the scale of constitutional federalism, the overseas departments 
would have a score of (2) given that as a French region, they enjoy a limited number of 
authoritative competencies. In regards to their special territorial autonomy scale, they would 
score a (0) given their status as an overseas department in which French law is applied the same 
as in metropolitan France. For the scale on the overseas departments’ role in the central 
government, they would get an overall score of (1). The reason for this is because although the 
French regions are not represented in the French legislature, the overseas departments also have 
the particularity of functioning as a region. In regards to regional elections, the overseas 
departments would have an overall score of (2) given that they all have a directly elected 
regional council. It needs to be noted, however, that even though Mayotte is also an overseas 
department, the reason it was excluded from the selection is due because it officially became an 
overseas department in 2014, falling outside the thesis’s chronological scope. 
These variables are compiled into Table 1, The Outermost Regions’ Regional Governance 
in the European Union, 2007-2013. This table compiles the Outermost Regions’ numerical scores 
based on the different variables assigned based on Hooghe and Marks’s (2001) table. Every 
column in the table consists of each of the aforementioned variables alongside their numerical 
score for each of the variables assigned to each of the Outermost Regions. The last column, the 
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Summary Score, indicates the numerical sum of each of the variables with higher numerical scores 
indicating a higher degree of political autonomy and lower numerical scores indicating otherwise 
as one can see below.   
Table 1: The Outermost Regions’ Regional Governance in the European Union, 2007-2013 
Table adapted from Hooghe and Marks’s Regional Governance in the EU (2001: 193-194) 
Independent Variable II: Allocation of Structural Funds 
 
 Structural funds are the financial tools set to implement the EU’s Regional Policy. They 
consist of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), 
the Cohesion Fund (CF), the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), and 
the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF). For the purposes of this thesis, however, the 
focus will be on the structural funds assigned for the regions which are the ERDF and the ESF. It 

















3 2 1 2 8 
Madeira 2 1 2 2 7 
Azores 2 1 2 2 7 
Martinique 2 0 1 2 5 
Guadeloupe 2 0 1 2 5 
Réunion 2 0 1 2 5 
French 
Guyana 
2 0 1 2 5 
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 In order to measure this variable, archival research is relied upon in which most of the 
information can be readily found on EU governmental websites such as Inforegio, the 
Commission’s General Directorate site on regional and urban development, as well as Eurostat, 
the statistical office of the EU. Other sites in which data can readily be obtained are Cohesion 
Policy websites from each of the member states as well as their respective Outermost Regions.  
While GDP is the measure of economic activity, the EU measures its member states and 
its respective regions’ economic activity through GDP per capita in purchasing power standards, 
or PPS, currently towards the EU28 average, which always equals 100. Regions with a GDP per 
capita in PPS of less than 100 are typically under the EU28 average while regions with an 
average of over 100 are typically above. The reason as to why the EU uses this measure is due to 
their common currency which eliminates the difference in price levels between member states 
and regions allowing for meaningful comparisons of GDP between countries. Data collection for 
GDP in PPS is obtained through Eurostat.     
Hypotheses 
The following section details the thesis’s hypotheses each of which are derived from the 
aforementioned research questions. Most of the thesis’s hypotheses have arrived on what has 
been established in the literature review (e.g. Tuñón, 2008; Hooghe and Marks, 1996; Bomber 
and Peterson, 1998). Each of the hypotheses represent a correlation, whether positive or 
negative, between the thesis’s research variables of political autonomy, structural fund 
allocation, and the regions’ economic success or lack thereof. The first research hypothesis states 





H1: The degree of political autonomy correlates positively with the Outermost Regions’ 
economic success towards the end of the 2007-2013 structural programming period. 
 
The thesis’s first research question asks whether variation in a region’s political 
autonomy leads to economic success. In other words, the higher the political autonomy of the 
Outermost Region, the higher its economic success. Evidence for this hypothesis has been 
proven numerous times in Tuñón (2008); Hooghe and Marks (1996); as well as Bomberg and 
Peterson (1998). Although not necessarily focusing on the Outermost Regions, in each of their 
articles it has been proven that regions with a higher degree of political autonomy tend to 
correlate positively with higher economic development. The reason for this is due because as 
autonomous political units, these regions have mobilized within the EU’s numerous institutions 
as a means to exert their influence (e.g. Tuñón, 2008; Hooghe and Marks, 1996; Bomber and 
Peterson, 1998). While little research has been done to study this, the thesis expects the same 
relationship of regional funding to hold in ultraperipheral regions as it does in continental 
Europe.  
H2: The amount of allocated structural funds correlates positively with a region’s growth 
in GDP per capita in PPS towards the end of the 2007-2013 programming period. 
 
 When focusing on structural fund allocation and regional economic growth, it can be 
stated that throughout the different programming periods, regions have showed increased GDP 
growth. Evidence of this came precisely with the 2006 Cohesion Policy reform in which 
Convergence Regions, formerly Objective 1 regions, became Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment Regions (Bachtler, et al., 2007). This meant that these regions were to receive a 
decreasing annual amount of structural fund allocations given that their GDP per capita in PPS 
was closer to the, then, established EU25 average.   
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Examples involving the Outermost Regions applied specifically to the Canary Islands and 
Madeira out of most of the regions within each member state (Bachtler, et al., 2007). Their 
increased economic growth, however, could have also been due to their political autonomy that 
has been constitutionally granted by Spain and Portugal respectively. The reason for this 
statement is due because the French overseas departments have remained under the Convergence 
objective despite their status as Outermost Regions as well as their increased allocation of annual 
structural funds throughout previous programming periods. On the other hand, it needs to be 
taken into consideration that the EU underwent its Eastern expansion in the years prior to the 
establishment of the 2007-2013 structural programming period. Because of the newer Eastern 
member states’ relative poverty vis-à-vis the EU15 member states, intermediate eligibility 
categories such as the Phasing-out and Phasing-in regions were created as a means to tackle the 
statistical effect of enlargement (Baun an Marek, 2014; Bachtler, et al., 2007).  
Conclusion 
 The thesis’s research design consists of a reiteration of the thesis’s overarching research 
question. This chapter divides its research questions establishing the variables. The independent 
variables consist of the Outermost Regions’ degree of political autonomy and the allocation of 
structural funds. The measure of political autonomy is based on Hooghe and Marks’s table on 
Regional Governance in the EU, 1950-2000 (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). Like Hooghe and 
Marks, this thesis also relies on legal and constitutional provisions as a means to prevent 
ambiguity. The measure of structural fund allocation consists of archival research which is 
obtained from EU and member state governmental websites such as Inforegio and Eurostat. The 
dependent variable, on the other hand, consists of the Outermost Regions’ economic success, or 
growth in GDP per capita in PPS towards the EU28 average of 100. Like the variable on 
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structural fund allocation, data on the Outermost Regions’ growth in GDP can also be obtained 
from Eurostat. In addition, it is this chapter where the thesis’s hypotheses are also established. 
The following chapter focuses on the results section determining whether or not the hypothesis 






















CHAPTER 8: RESULTS 
 This chapter focuses on the results based on the hypotheses established in the research 
design section. This thesis relies on the data obtained from EU sources such as Inforegio and 
Eurostat, as well as member state government sources dedicated to the allocation and 
distribution of EU regional funds. For each of the hypotheses and tables established, this chapter 
provides an explanation of the obtained results taking notes of any incongruencies contradicting 
the established hypotheses. 
 The first hypothesis, H1, discusses the relationship between the Outermost Regions’ 
political autonomy and their economic success, which is defined as the rise in GDP per capita in 
PPS towards the EU28 average of 100 during the 2007-2013 programming period. The following 
tables in the hypothesis’ discussion consist of the Outermost Regions’ table of regional 
governance in the EU, Table 1, as followed by the table on their growth in GDP during the 2007-













H1: The degree of political autonomy correlates positively with the Outermost Regions’ 
economic success towards the end of the 2007-2013 structural programming period. 
 
Table 2:  
The Outermost Regions’ Regional Governance in the European Union, 2007-2013 
 
Table 3:  
Outermost Regions’ Regional Gross Domestic Product per capita in  
Purchasing Power Standards at the end of the 2007-2013 Programming Period (EU28=100)1 
Outermost Regions Programming Year 2013 
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1 Data obtained from Eurostat (2019) Regional gross domestic product (PPS per inhabitant in % of the EU28 

















3 2 1 2 8 
Madeira 2 1 2 2 7 
Azores 2 1 2 2 7 
Martinique 2 0 1 2 5 
Guadeloupe 2 0 1 2 5 
Réunion 2 0 1 2 5 
French 
Guyana 
2 0 1 2 5 
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The correlation coefficient between these two variables is 0.45, meaning that it is a 
moderately low positive correlation (Sánchez Viera, 2004: 176). Given this result, it can be 
stated that although there is a positive correlation between the Outermost Regions’ degree of 
political autonomy and their GDP growth, this correlation is not a strong one. By observing both 
Table 1 and Table 2, one can still notice that the hypothesis still holds, however weakly. The 
Canary Islands, for instance, which has the highest summary score on regional governance 
among the Outermost Regions, a summary score of 8, still held a GDP per capita in PPS of 76. 
The highest among all of the Outermost Regions. The same argument would also apply to 
Madeira, which has a regional governance summary score of 7 and ended up with a GDP per 
capita in PPS of 72.  
Inconsistencies within this hypothesis begin to appear when it comes to the French 
overseas departments. As a whole, all of the French overseas departments have a regional 
governance summary score of 5, yet the overseas departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe 
ended the 2007-2013 programming period with a GDP per capita in PPS of 75 and 72 
respectively. While these GDP scores are still lower than the Canary Islands’ GDP per capita 
score, they are nevertheless higher or equal than those of the Portuguese Outermost Regions. It is 
precisely the French overseas departments the regions that seem to undermine H1 and possibly 
one of the main tenets of multilevel governance as their low political autonomy was not an 








H2: The amount of allocated structural funds correlates positively with a region’s growth in 
GDP per capita in PPS towards the end of the 2007-2013 structural programming period. 
 
Table 4:  
Table on Initial Regional Allocation for the ERDF and ESF  





























254,224,328 66,324,676 125,000,000 RCE 
(Phasing-in) 
445,549,004 
Azores 900,748,216 65,000,833 190,000,000 Convergence 1,156,349,049 
Martinique 309,887,568  107,268,264 97,859,232 Convergence 515,015,064 
Guadeloupe 422,402,319 102,299,215 185,176,372 Convergence 727,877,905 
Réunion 808,467,706 205,824,071 516,889,189 Convergence 1,531,180,965 
French 
Guyana 



















                                                          




Difference in the Outermost Regions’ GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards 
During the 2007-2013 Structural Programming Period (EU28=100) 3 
 
This hypothesis tests the main purpose of Cohesion Policy, which is the granting of 
structural funds to the EU’s least developed regions as a means to bridging the gap between 
richer and poorer regions. Allocation and amount of structural funds, however, is conditional to 
the regions’ categorical eligibility which, in this case, could fall into either Convergence, 
Phasing-in, Phasing-out, or Regional Competitiveness and Employment (RCE) regions, 
depending on their GDP per capita in PPS in terms of the EU average. Theoretically speaking, 
the granting of structural funds should assist the regions’ development towards the established 
EU average. This means that as regions develop, they should be able to grow out of their 
eligibility categorizations and, consequently, rely less on EU structural funds.  
It must be noted that Table 3 presents the total allocation of ERDF and ESF funds for 
each of the Outermost Regions. Looking at both Table 3 and Table 4 one can see that this 
hypothesis presents a negative, yet moderately low, correlation of -0.32 (Sánchez Viera, 2004: 
                                                          
3 The asterisk * means that the GDP per capita in PPS was based on the EU27 average.   
Outermost Region GDPpc PPS in 2007 GDPpc PPS in 2013 Difference in 
GDPpc PPS 
Canary Islands 91 76 -15 
Madeira 80 73 -7 
Azores 72 69 -3 
Martinique 75.1* 77 1.9 
Guadeloupe 76.3* 73 -3.3 
Réunion 62.5* 70 7.5 
French Guyana 48.7* 58 9.3 
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176). In other words, the higher the amount of structural funds, the lower the GDP growth. The 
reason for this may be due to the fact that most of the Outermost Regions presented negative 
growth in their GDP per capita in PPS towards the end of the 2007-2013 programming period 
despite the total allocated amount. As with the previous hypothesis, it needs to be mentioned that 
this lack of growth came as a result of the 2008 global financial crisis. Out of all of the 
Outermost Regions, however, only the French overseas departments of French Guyana, Réunion, 
and Martinique presented a positive growth in GDP of 9.3, 7.5, and 1.9 respectively. In regards 
to the total amount of allocated funds, French Guyana, Réunion, and Martinique received a total 
of 405,217,891, 1,531,180,965, and 515,015,064 respectively. These amounts differ considerably 
from the total allocations received by the Canary Islands and the Azores with each region 
receiving 1,626,287,309, and 1,156,349,049 respectively. Despite these high amounts, both 
regions experienced a negative growth of -15 and-3 respectively.  
Conclusion    
 This chapter focused on providing the results for each of the established hypotheses. 
Most of the data gathered was obtained through EU and member state websites such as Eurostat 
as well as the member states’ NSRFs. Aside from showing the gathered data within their 
respective tables, it must be noted, however, that none of the established hypotheses were 
actually proven. Not only could the conclusion be determined through sheer observation of the 
tables, correlation tests also confirmed the hypotheses lack of sustainability. The following 






CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION 
This chapter explores why the thesis’s hypotheses showed a positive, yet moderately low, 
correlation, in regards to H1, and a negative correlation, as occurred with H2. The chapter is 
divided into the following sections. The first section points out any interesting findings present in 
the data set. The second section provides alternate explanations for the hypotheses’ results. The 
following two sections focus on the implication of the findings on multilevel governance theory 
as well as EU policy-making. Finally, this chapter concludes with the thesis’ limitations as well 
as its next steps towards future research.  
Interesting Findings on the Data Set 
  In the data set, the following results were worthy of notice. The results presented for H1 
showed a positive, yet moderately low, correlation of 0.45 between the Outermost Regions’ 
political autonomy and their growth in GDP per capita in PPS. Despite support for this 
hypothesis, there are inconsistencies when it comes to the French overseas departments. The 
French overseas departments hold a summary score of (5) as stated in Table 1 yet, departments 
such as Martinique and Guadeloupe, ended the 2007-2013 programming period with GDPs 
greater or equal than those of the Portuguese Outermost Regions. This proves to be an interesting 
finding because it undermines a main tenet in multilevel governance that regions a high degree 
of political autonomy consequently experience increased economic growth (e.g. Hooghe and 
Marks, 2001). Because of the results presented by the French overseas departments, it could be 
stated that there must be another variable that serves as a better determinant for a regions’ 
economic growth that was not taken into consideration for this thesis. Such variable could 
possibly be changes done in the programming method. The 2006 Reform on Cohesion Policy 
required close cooperation between the EU’s distinct levels of governments in the formulation of 
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NSRFs and OPs (Bachtler, et al., 2007). This entailed that regions could exert influence in the 
implementation and allocation of structural funds despite the member states’ political 
decentralization.    
In regards to H2, the correlation coefficient presents a negative, yet moderately low, 
correlation of -0.32. Given the correlation coefficient it would seem that the higher the amount of 
allocated structural funds, the lesser the regions’ GDP growth. This correlation coefficient, 
however, was obtained through the grouping of the Outermost Regions in study. When taken 
individually, or compared amongst other Outermost Regions, one can notice a lack of correlation 
between the amount of structural fund allocation and growth in GDP. For instance, if one were to 
compare Réunion and the Azores one can easily notice they both form part of the Convergence 
objective and each received a near similar amount of 1,531,180,965 and 1,156,349,049 
respectively. Yet, towards the end of the 2007-2013 programming period only Réunion 
experienced a positive GDP growth of 7.5 while the Azores experienced a negative growth of -3. 
On the other hand, regions like French Guyana and Martinique each received a total of 
405,217,891 and 515,015,064 respectively both finishing the programming period with a positive 
GDP of 9.3 and 1.9 respectively. When compared to the amounts allocated to the Canary Islands 
and the Azores, the amounts allocated to French Guyana and Martinique are much lower in 
comparison. This shows evidence that high structural amount allocation does not necessarily lead 
to growth in GDP per capita in PPS.  
Another aspect to also take into consideration are each of the Outermost Regions’ 
eligibility categories. Although these categories do not determine the total amount of funds to be 
received, they do determine the annual amount to be received throughout the programming 
period. When observing both Table 3 and Table 4, one can notice, with the exceptions of the 
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Azores and Guadeloupe, that is only the Convergence Regions the regions that experienced 
positive growth towards the end of the programing period.  
Alternative Explanations 
 This thesis consisted of two hypotheses each of which established a correlation between 
the independent variables of political autonomy and structural fund allocation, and the dependent 
variable of growth in GDP per capita in PPS. When testing for H1, the hypothesis established a 
positive, yet moderately low, correlation between political autonomy and GDP growth. This 
suggests that there are other, more influential, variables that explain regional growth in GDP. 
One idea as to why the variable of political autonomy was not as influential when determining 
the Outermost Regions’ growth in GDP in PPS would have probably had to do with the 
dynamics established by the 2006 Cohesion Policy Reform. Before the implementation of the 
2006 reform, works on multilevel governance argued that the reason why Cohesion Policy had 
variable effects across the EU was due to the regions’ access to information and influence 
throughout the different stages of structural programming (Marks, 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 
2001). As a result, regions from federalized or highly decentralized member states enjoyed better 
access as well as exerted much more influence in regards to the allocation and implementation of 
structural funds.  
The 2006 reform on Cohesion Policy, on the other hand, mandated that the development 
of NSRFs and OPs included the member states’ respective regions in their planning and 
implementation (Baun and Marek, 2014). This meant that regions were included regardless of 
the member states’ degree of political decentralization. On the one hand, the implementation of 
such policy has provided further evidence of the statement that Cohesion Policy has caused a 
deepened decentralization of its member states as they have become required to involve their 
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regions in the planning and allocation of funds (e.g. Bache, 2008; Baun and Marek, 2014). This 
would entail that regions would now have equal access to exert influence in the planning and 
allocation of structural funds. As a result of such egalitarian access, this dynamic has been 
carried over to the current programming period of 2014-2020. Member states are still required to 
draw up partnership agreements “in cooperation with subnational and non-governmental partners 
and ‘in dialogue’ with the Commission (Baun and Marek, 2014: 128). It needs to be kept into 
consideration that the variable of political autonomy has lost influence only when it has come to 
the planning, allocation, and implementation of structural funds. Despite the decentralization 
experienced in the past decades, member states have decentralized in varying degrees with their 
respective regions exerting varying use of their respective member states as well as the EU’s 
institutions.      
 In regards to H2, not only did the hypothesis not hold, it also established a negative 
correlation between the variables. In theory, Cohesion Policy was designed to aid the regions 
towards their economic growth as measured as their rise in GDP per capita in PPS. Yet, from 
what the correlation coefficient hints at, it would seem that the more regional funds are allocated, 
the lesser the likelihood they experience GDP growth. This would have seemed to be the case for 
both the Canary Islands and the Azores which received the highest amounts of structural funds 
and yet presented negative growth towards the end of the 2007-2013 structural programming 
period. Another aspect to take into consideration, are the Outermost Regions’ eligibility 
categories. The idea is that as regions increase their GDP per capita in PPS towards the EU 
average, EU financial assistance is set to decrease in terms of allocations over time. This applied 
to the Canary Islands and Madeira, who were both under the RCE Phasing-in objective. Being 
under this category meant that they received decreasing annual allocations throughout the 
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programming period. The rest of the Outermost Regions, on the other hand, fell under the 
Convergence objective in which they received increased financial allocations throughout the 
programming period. This may possibly explain the reason why most of the Convergence 
objective regions finished the 2007-2013 programming period with a higher, positive, difference 
in GDP or even a lower negative difference when compared to the RCE Phasing-in regions. One 
possible explanation for H2’s result would be the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis. The 
2008 crisis affected each of the Outermost Regions equally in the sense that they all experienced 
low economic growth or a decrease in their GDP per capita in PPS. As regions in the RCE 
Phasing-in objective, it could be argued that their decreasing annual allocations limited their 
capacity to cope with the impact of the 2008 financial crisis than Convergence regions.  
 Given the analyses from the previous paragraphs, one can notice how the consequences 
of policy can affect the economic development of the Outermost Regions, as well as European 
regions in general. For instance, the gradual member state decentralization that has occurred 
throughout the EU’s distinct programming periods has caused their increased inclusion within 
the planning and allocation of structural funds. This increased inclusion, in turn, has led to the 
Outermost Regions to exert influence in the planning and application of structural funds. While 
such inclusion has benefitted European regions in general, policy should be implemented when it 
comes to external shocks.     
Implication of Findings in the Thesis’ Theoretical Framework 
  Despite the hypotheses’ results, there is no reason to fully discard multilevel governance 
as the thesis’s theoretical framework. For instance, multilevel governance has successfully 
explained why member states have decentralized politically as well as why regions within the 
EU have mobilized throughout its levels of governments (e.g. Hooghe and Marks, 2001). It has 
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been argued that the reason for this has come as a result of cohesion policy and its introduction 
of the partnership principle (Baun and Marek, 2014). This has proven to the case in regards to H1 
as it confirmed what has been stated in past works on regional mobilization (e.g. Bomberg and 
Peterson, 1998; Marks, 1996). Taking the Outermost Regions into consideration, multilevel 
governance can easily explain their differentiated policies, such as the POSEI programmes, as 
well as their differentiated status within the EU’s distinct levels of governments. On the other 
hand, works on regional mobilization have tended to focus on the amount of influence regions 
exert within their own member states and EU institutions most of which establish a positive 
correlation between political autonomy and economic success (e.g. Bomberg and Peterson, 
1998). The positive, yet moderately low, correlation obtained in H1 while confirming of one of 
the main tenets of multilevel governance, clearly shows that political autonomy alone is not 
enough to explain the regions’ GDP growth.  
 When it comes to H2, it can perhaps be stated that multilevel governance cannot be 
applied as a means to explain the Outermost Regions’ growth in GDP. While the regions’ 
increased influence has consequently brought increased, specialized, structural funds, the 
allocation of structural funds is not enough to guarantee their economic growth in GDP. It would 
seem that while multilevel governance can explain for the regions’ allocation of structural funds, 
it cannot explain the consequences of their allocation and use.          
Limitations of this Thesis 
 One of the limitations for this thesis consists of its case selection. First of all, the case 
selection consisted of the EU’s Outermost Regions as the universe of case studies. This universe 
in itself is considerably small, at present consisting of only 8 Outermost Regions, when 
compared to the whole of European regions. However, because of the Outermost Regions’ 
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position within both their national and EU levels of governments, replicability towards other 
European regions would also be an issue as regions within the rest of the EU do not have the 
constitutional nor the treaty-based recognition that have been assigned to them. This would mean 
that future comparative work on the Outermost Regions would most likely be limited amongst 
this universe of case studies. If comparative research were to be applied between the Outermost 
Regions and regions in continental Europe, then the variables on the Outermost Regions’ 
constitutional and treaty recognitions would have to be controlled in order for research to be 
replicable.    
 Another limitation involves the selection of variables. One such variable is the variable of 
political autonomy. This variable has been acknowledged to be ambiguous in its definition and, 
hence, the reason why Hooghe and Marks solely relied on constitutional documents when 
defining political autonomy (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). Solely relying on constitutional 
documents, however, would only provide a limited definition of the concept. On the other hand, 
despite elements of political autonomy being present within the respective member states’ 
constitutions, the member states themselves have their own interpretation of what constitutes 
political autonomy. In addition, it needs to be mentioned that political practices are not always 
bound to what is stated in political constitutions. Oftentimes, practices in self-government are 
established through convention and, as a result, such practices are not necessarily established in 
political documents.  
Another variable to take into consideration are both the allocation of structural funds and 
the use of GDP per capita in PPS as a means to measure economic growth. This thesis works 
under the assumption that the allocation of structural funds leads to GDP growth when results 
have shown that this is not necessarily the case. Another aspect to take into consideration is the 
73 
 
fact that this thesis only focuses on the role of EU structural funds as the source of the Outermost 
Regions’ economic growth, specifically focusing on the ERDF and the ESF. These are but two 
of Cohesion Policy’s numerous types of structural funds. Other types of structural fund, such as 
the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and the European Maritime 
and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) were not taken into consideration and yet funds from these 
categories were also allocated to the Outermost Regions possibly contributing to their economic 
growth. As a result, there might be some interference between the GDP per capita in PPS 
measure and other structural funds.       
It is also worth mentioning that this thesis relied on correlation as a measurement. While 
the correlation metric proved, albeit moderately, the thesis’s first hypothesis as well as the 
theoretical framework’s main tenets, it needs to be emphasized that correlation does not entail 
causation. Although one could get an idea of the relationship, both positive and negative, 
between the established research variables, it does not necessarily look for the causes of the 
Outermost Regions’ economic growth. Taking a look at this aspect of the Outermost Regions’ 
economic growth could very well serve as a next step towards future research. Although not 
focusing specifically on the Outermost Regions, qualitative research on regional influence in the 
planning and allocation of structural funds (e.g. Bomberg and Peterson, 1998; Tuñón, 2008). On 
the other hand, it needs to be considered the metric in which regional growth is measured, which 
is based on the EU’s scale of GDP per capita in PPS based on the current EU average. Although 
the EU uses this measurement to take into consideration the bloc’s common currency, this 
measure does not necessarily take into consideration the regions’ economic growth and 
development.   
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Despite this thesis consisting of a quantitative research, were it to take a qualitative turn 
the results the focus would have been different. A qualitative research would seek to replicate 
Hooghe and Marks (2001) research on variability in Cohesion Policy. In this research they relied 
on constitutional provisions as a means to determine the member states’ degree of political 
autonomy as well as they also relied on elite interviews from both the member state as well as 
EU officials. They, however, wanted to determine the amount of influence regions and member 
states exerted during the planning and allocation of structural funds. “Influence”, for the 
purposes of their research, was defined as “the relative capacity of an actor to shape policy 
outcomes” (ibid.; 2001: 104). That capacity, however, depends on the amount of information 
present and shared between the EU’s levels of government and throughout the different planning 
stages. This same approach has also been applied to the Outermost Regions although not through 
a comparative study amongst them (e.g. Tuñón, 2008; Antunes and Magone, 2018). In this case, 
rather than measure the impact of structural funds on the Outermost Regions, a qualitative 
approach will attempt to measure their influence in the planning and allocation of structural 
funds throughout the 2007-2013 programming period. Through a quantitative approach, the 
thesis only focused on the end result of the impact between political autonomy, structural fund 
allocation, and the Outermost Regions’ growth in GDP per capita in PPS. One advantage 
towards this approach was the objectivity of the data obtained which was obtained from 







CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 
 This thesis sought to answer the following research question: “Why are some regions in 
the EU much more economically successful than others?” The thesis chose to focus on the 
Outermost Regions to better understand their situation relative to the regions in continental 
Europe. The Outermost, or Ultraperipheral, Regions of the EU are characterized by their 
insularity, remoteness from the European continent, as well as low levels of economic 
development vis-à-vis regions in the European continent. As a result, these regions enjoy both 
their respective member states’ constitutional as well as EU treaty-based recognition of their 
structural and economic handicaps. 
 Despite these recognitions at both levels of government, some Outermost Regions are 
much more economically developed than others. It is argued that the reason for their variation in 
economic success is due as a result of their varying degrees in political autonomy. Regions with 
a broader degree of political autonomy, such as the Canary Islands, have presented higher levels 
of economic success as measured in growth in GDP per capita in PPS; whereas regions with 
lower political autonomy, such as the French overseas departments, have traditionally presented 
the lowest levels of economic success. Taking multilevel governance as the thesis’s theoretical 
framework, its overarching research question was divided into two research questions looking at 
the correlation of the impact of political autonomy and structural fund allocation on economic 
success. As for chronological scope, this thesis took the 2007-2013 structural programming 
period given that it is the most recent period in which enough data is available in order to arrive 
to a firm conclusion.  
 The results obtained when establishing the research variables’ correlations either proved 
to be positive, yet moderately low, or negative, albeit low. For instance, the correlation between 
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the Outermost Regions’ political autonomy and their GDP per capita in PPS towards the end of 
the 2007-2013 programming period established a correlation coefficient of 0.45. This result still 
confirms one of multilevel governance’s main tenets on the relationship between political 
autonomy and economic growth. Despite the positive relationship between both variables, the 
correlation coefficient suggests that there must be other, more influential, variables determining 
the Outermost Regions’ economic success. Evidence of the weak correlation can be noted when 
observing Tables 1 and 2, as the French overseas departments, which had the lowest summary 
score of (5), ended the programming period with GDP scores similar to those of the Portuguese 
Outermost Regions.     
 In regards to H2, the relationship between the variables of structural fund allocation and 
economic growth presented a correlation coefficient of -0.32. This result entails a negative, albeit 
low, correlation between structural fund allocation and the Outermost Regions’ GDP growth. 
This would mean that the higher the amount, the lower the likelihood of experiencing GDP 
growth. When observing Tables 3 and 4, however, one can observe how structural fund 
allocation is not enough of a determining variable for growth in GDP. One can easily observe 
that structural fund allocations varied numerically between the regions. However, when 
comparing the amounts allocated to each of them, one can notice how regions that received 
substantially high amounts of structural fund allocation experienced negative GDP growth while 
regions that received lesser amounts experienced substantial growth throughout the 2007-2013 
programming period.  
     Although this thesis only focused on the Outermost Regions’ GDP growth towards the 
end of the 2007-2013 programming period, its focus strictly focused on a quantitative approach 
and based on correlative relationship. Next possible steps in which to take this thesis, is to 
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establish a qualitative approach towards this research. A qualitative approach would seek to 
replicate Hooghe and Marks (2001) research on regional influence throughout the different 
stages in structural programming (see also Bomberg and Peterson, 1998; Tuñón, 2008; Antunes 
and Magone, 2018). Unlike the approach taken for this thesis, which focused on the end results, a 
qualitative approach would focus on the initial stages of the development and planning of 
structural funds. Rather than measure economic growth, a qualitative approach would measure 
the Outermost Regions’ influence as “the relative capacity of an actor to shape policy outcomes” 
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APPENDIX: LIST OF COHESION POLICY WEBSITES  
For the European Union:  
Inforegio 
Eurostat 
For France:  
L’Europe s’engage en France  
L’Europe s’engage en Guyane  
L’Europe s’engage en Martinique  
L’Europe s’engage en Réunion 
L’Europe s’engage en Guadeloupe 
For Portugal: 
Quadro de referência estratégico nacional, (Portugal’s NSRF website) 
Instituto de desenvolvimento regional, IP-RAM, (Madeira) 
Proconvergência Açores, (Azores) 
For Spain: 
Dirección general de fondos europeos (Directorate General for Community Funds) 
Gobierno de canarias (The Canary Islands’ Government website)  
 
